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Debate continues over how best to tap the private interests of enterprise
participants to serve the public interest. In large part, proponents and
critics of structural reform in corporate governance remain divided over
whether participants within the enterprise or external institutions should
define and police "responsible" corporate activity.1 Yet, questions concern-
ing the self-regulatory potential of the enterprise are not limited to the
corporate governance debate: They also surface in modest guise even
within the existing framework of corporate regulation, a framework that
relies primarily on corporate profit seeking under external legal con-
straints. In this more limited context, the question becomes how external
controls ought to be crafted and enforced, and whom they ought to target.
When, for example, can we rely on liability rules directed solely at the
corporation to assure compliance with legal norms? When should we im-
pose absolute legal duties and sanctions on individual participants in the
firm as well? To analyze these narrower questions of self-regulatory ca-
pacity, we must go beyond a simple description of the formal duties that
the law imposes on corporate participants. We must also ask how existing
legal duties affect the actual incentives of corporate participants, and
whether they do so in ways that yield the "right" amount of compliance
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with legal rules-bearing in mind that enforcing these duties is itself
costly.
2
In this Article, I discuss the circumstances under which liability rules
should directly target the incentives of leading corporate participants to
control corporate wrongdoing. Although my primary concern is with the
conduct of large firms, I focus on the key actors who possess significant
influence on business decisions in all firms, both large and small. These
actors always include senior executives, who assume the risk of illegal
conduct on behalf of the firm; in addition, they may include influential
outsiders-directors, attorneys, accountants, and others-who are in a po-
sition to veto corporate delicts. In Parts I and II, I argue that enterprise
liability rather than individual liability is, and ought to be, the dominant
regime for controlling corporate malfeasance except when it leads to un-
derenforcement of legal norms. In Parts III through V, I isolate three
such occasions-which I style asset insufficiency, sanction insufficiency,
and enforcement insufficiency-and explore their implications for corpo-
rate regulation through the imposition of liability upon enterprise
participants.
I. REGIMES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND DUAL LIABILITY
The iron law of tort and criminal liability for corporate delicts is this:
Liability risks, if left unchannelled, ordinarily attach to the legal entity
(the corporation) rather than to its officers, employees, or agents. No-
where does this law operate more forcefully than in the relationship be-
tween the firm and its top managers, who routinely enjoy sweeping liabil-
ity insurance or indemnification benefits at corporate expense. At first
glance, such private risk shifting seems to erode the very foundations of
legal duty, because personal risk is inseparable from incentive and even
"responsibility." Its logic becomes apparent, however, if we trace its role
within the broader system of private controls on firm activity.
A. De Facto Unitary Liability Through Risk Shifting
In theory, the basic principles of agency law establish a regime of "dual
liability," in which both the firm and its culpable agents share potential
liability for most corporate activities that injure third parties. The com-
mon law doctrine of respondeat superior' and its statutory equivalents as-
2. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL ECON. 169
(1968); Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).
3. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212-13, 215, 217B, 219 (1958); Developments in
the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 1227, 1247-51 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Crime].
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sure that firms and their agents are ordinarily jointly and severally liable
for fault-based civil damages. Similarly, the dominant regime of liability
in criminal law holds both the firm and the agent responsible for crimes
committed within the scope of the agent's employment.4
In practice, however, much of this dual structure collapses. Subsidized
insurance, routine indemnification, and the preferences of prosecutors and
aggrieved plaintiffs5 combine to assure that the enterprise's culpable
agents bear little direct legal risk except for the most egregious offenses.
Regardless of the dictates of formal doctrine, the actual distribution of
legal risks more closely approximates a unitary regime of enterprise liabil-
ity than a dual regime of firm and personal liability. The corporation
typically bears the brunt of tort damages or criminal penalties arising out
of the activities of its agents or employees. Except in the most serious
cases, culpable corporate agents are monitored and sanctioned internally:
The firm may fire, demote, or otherwise discipline managers or employees
whose actions create unacceptable legal risks.
This pervasive risk shifting raises two questions that are central to our
understanding of the functions of dual liability. When we allow such risk
shifting, what enforcement function remains for individual liability? Al-
ternatively, when we constrain individual risk shifting and compel corpo-
rate agents to bear "absolute" personal liability for their delicts, what en-
forcement advantages do we gain or lose?' The personal liability of senior
corporate managers and directors poses these questions in a particularly
forceful, albeit paradoxical, way. Imposing absolute liability on actors at
the apex of the corporate hierarchy seems most likely to serve as an effec-
tive control over organizational conduct. Yet it is precisely here, among
top corporate decisionmakers, that contractual devices and legal policies
function most effectively to deflect personal legal risks. Further considera-
4. See, e.g., United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
347 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-4 (1981); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1984); Corporate Crime, supra note 3, at 1247.
5. Although public enforcement officials and plaintiffs may find the option of pursuing individual
managers a comforting fallback or a useful lever in discovery and settlement proceedings, see infra
pp. 888, 890-91, it is an option whose full exercise is frequently costly and sometimes illusory. Be-
yond requiring proof of the culpability of the firm for the delict at issue-which enterprise liability
also demands-managerial liability ordinarily forces plaintiffs to disentangle the web of decisionmak-
ing responsibility within the firm. At best, this requires additional effort; at worst, it may be fruitless,
when, for example, delicts are the outcome of aggregate conduct for which no one is individually
culpable. See Coffee, "No Soul To Damn; No Body To Kick". An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MiCH. L. REv. 386, 395-97 (1981); Kornhauser, An Economic
Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REv.
1345, 1370-73 (1982); Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct,
90 YALE L.J. 1, 31 (1980).
6. These questions have only recently begun to receive careful theoretical attention in a variety of
contexts. See Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRim. L. REv. 409
(1980); Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. (1984) (forthcoming); sources cited
supra note 5.
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tion of this apparent paradox, however, reveals the cost advantages of
"pure" enterprise liability as an enforcement device over a wide range of
firm delicts.
Consider first the chief element of the paradox: the insulation afforded
corporate directors and top managers from personal risk for firm wrong-
doing. Even in the absence of any contractual devices to shift risk from
corporate management, the basic forms of legal duty evidence a protective
skew. Neither the doctrine of respondeat superior nor the corporate fidu-
ciary's duty of care7 seriously restrict the top manager's most powerful
risk-shifting tool-delegating legally risky policies to subordinates.' With
few exceptions, public enforcement officials or private victims can obtain
judgments against a manager only for his personal conduct;9 power within
the firm does not generate a legal "duty to supervise" subordinates' con-
duct. Similarly, the business judgment rule insulates officers and directors
from liability to the corporation for the failure to institute managerial con-
trols that might have avoided legal injury.10 Thus, absent allegations of
7. Corporation law imposes a duty on managers and directors to exercise reasonable care in the
discharge of their corporate duties. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1977); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1979). See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CORPORATIONS 518-62 (5th ed. 1980) (discussing duty of reasonable care).
8. Respondeat superior channels liability to the firm rather than to its controlling managers. See
supra note 3. Corporate directors and officers ordinarily satisfy their duty of care to shareholders
when they rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates; they need not establish monitoring
procedures when there is no reason to suspect subordinate wrongdoing. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963). For contrasting attempts to delineate monitoring
duties, see Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1982) (imposing
duty to maintain system of internal accounting controls on firms); ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.01(b) (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1982) (duty of care includes reasonable concern "with the existence and effectiveness of moni-
toring programs, including law compliance programs"); see also infra note 10 (discussing business
judgment rule).
9. Put somewhat differently, managers and directors enjoy de facto insulation from liability-even
apart from risk-shifting agreements-because of the organizational buffer between themselves and
lower-level employees who implement their decisions. Managers are personally liable for decisions
that are negligent or criminal on their face, just as any citizen would be. But when the firm's top-level
policies merely impose a risk-even a high risk--of wrongdoing, the top executives or directors re-
sponsible for the decision generally escape liability for the consequences because the law assumes that
they intended their policies to be implemented in a "reasonable" and legal fashion. Of course, legisla-
tion may occasionally expand managerial liability for particular organizational delicts; top managers
are assigned a special duty to supervise subordinates or even a strict duty to prevent certain criminal
delicts entirely. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (imposing strict criminal liability
on firm's president for unsanitary warehouse conditions); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, §§ 206,
208, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5846, 5848 (1976) (imposing duty to report any noncompliance with Atomic En-
ergy Act requirements or any abnormal occurrences at nuclear facility on both "individual director[s]"
and "responsible officer[s]"); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, § 2, 33 U.S.C. §§
1317(d), 1318 (1976) (unlawful for owner or operator of source to operate in violation of effluent
standard and imposing penalties on owners for failure to supervise).
10. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983);
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Of-
fers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 822-24 (1981). But see McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd.,
491 F.2d 380, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1974) (business judgment rule does not protect from extreme or
Corporate Liability
self-dealing or other intentional disloyalty to the firm, top corporate offi-
cials are ordinarily at risk for the firm's injury of outsiders only when
they are singled out in a cause of action by third-party victims or enforce-
ment officials and only for injuries inflicted by their personal conduct.
Even this limited range of potential liability, however, attaches signifi-
cant personal liability to business decisions that would continue to weigh
heavily on managers and directors but for the institution of contractual
risk shifting. Top corporate officials can, and routinely do, procure indem-
nification"" or liability insurance1" for virtually all legal risks incurred on
lengthy failure to manage); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (egregious carelessness
falls outside scope of business judgment rule).
Although managers cannot be indemnified against damages arising from a breach of duty to the
corporation, see infra note 11, much of this risk is deflected by the business judgment rule. This rule
effectively creates a judicially imposed, standard-form, indemnification contract, which automatically
relieves the board-and, by extension, top managers who act with its approval-from liability to
shareholders for less egregious forms of personal negligence. Indeed, the business judgment rule is
even more protective than a right to indemnification because it also protects against managerial liabil-
ity to creditors when the firm is bankrupt. Only personal liability insurance can insulate as effectively
as the business judgment defense. See infra note 12 (discussing liability insurance). One reason for
acquiring such insurance is precisely that it covers the tiny risk of personal liability for negligent
breach of the manager's duty of care to the corporation which is not otherwise deflected by the busi-
ness judgment rule. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968).
11. See J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECrORS: INDEMNIFICATION
AND INSURANCE 1 6.03[7] (1981).
Delaware, for example, permits indemnification for the costs of defending against, and the liability
resulting from, third-party suits if the officer, director, or corporate agent "acted in good faith and in
a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and,
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983); see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5(b) (1982).
Delaware also allows the indemnification of a director, officer, or agent for the cost of defending
against a shareholder suit if he or she acted in good faith and not in opposition to the corporation's
interests and was not negligent or responsible for other misconduct related to his or her corporate
duties. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1983). The pre-1982 Model Act and the laws of some 21
states closely follow Delaware on these points, J. BISHOP, supra, 1 6.03, while other state indemnifi-
cation statutes are more restrictive in varying degrees, id. 1 6.05[1]-6.05110].
State law indemnification provisions are even less restrictive than they initially appear. Delaware
and the states following the former Model Act have so-called "nonexclusive" statutes, which allow
indemnification to extend beyond the limits ostensibly fixed by the statute if authorized by a by-law,
contract, or vote of disinterested directors or shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(0
(1983); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Aar § 5(0 (1979). But see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Aar § 5(g)
(1982) (making Model Act provisions exclusive). Thus, the ultimate limits of permissible indemnifica-
tion are left to public policy, as guided (but not fixed) by the express provisions of these acts. See
Bishop, supra note 10, at 1085-86. Even more important, state law typically leaves the decision
whether to indemnify to a quorum of disinterested directors or independent legal counsel. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1983); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AC § 5(e) (1982). This suggests
that porous statutory restrictions on indemnification are ordinarily construed broadly. See Bishop,
supra note 10, at 1079; Stone, supra note 5, at 50.
12. The corporate law of Delaware and of the majority of states following the former Model Act
appears to allow insurance for the liability of corporate insiders even when liability arises from acts
committed willfully or in bad faith. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983) (allowing insurance
even when indemnification is not permitted); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AC § 5(g) (1979) (same).
Commercially available directors' and officers' liability insurance policies, however, exclude such acts
from their coverage. See J. BISHOP, supra note 11, 1 6.0611]. In any event, insurance against liability
for acts taken in bad faith might be unenforceable on public-policy grounds. Id.; see Stone, supra note
5, at 52. As a practical matter, insurance functions primarily to reimburse the corporation for its
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behalf of the firm except those generated by intentional torts or knowing
criminal conduct. Thus, corporate officials can shift even the risks of pu-
nitive liability or criminal fines as long as these risks arise from actions
taken in good faith and without "reasonable cause" to know of their
illegality.
Hence the preliminary question: Why do we tolerate such massive
shifting of personal legal risks? The answer might seem simple if risk
shifting were restricted to liability for ordinary negligence. Here, the law
might arguably seek only the compensation of injury and not the deter-
rence of specific conduct."' But contractual risk shifting in the realm of
explicit regulation and punitive liability requires stronger justification.
Here, we do care who pays the penalty, at least insofar as we wish to
deter would-be wrongdoers. Risk shifting can be defended as a matter of
legal policy, then, only if absolute personal liability does not contribute to
deterrence, or if its contribution-however great-is offset by the costs
imposed on innocent firms and managers. In fact, risk shifting by corpo-
rate officials frequently meets one or both of these criteria. A brief sketch
of the roles of shareholders and managers in the publicly held corporation
shows why.
B. The Manager-Firm Relationship
The modern theory of the firm depicts the corporation as a nexus of
contracts among the suppliers of firm inputs-labor, capital, specialized
services, and the like.1 4 In this view, the separation of ownership from
control is a natural division of the entrepreneurial function into its two
constituent elements, risk bearing and management.15 As claimants on the
firm's earnings after other enterprise participants have been paid, share-
holders absorb the bulk of the net gains or losses from firm projects as
long as the firm remains solvent. The equity contract is ideally suited for
this risk-bearing function, particularly if shares trade in an active securi-
ties market. Limited liability assures that shareholders retain an unlimited
claim to the profits of successful firms but never risk more than the value
of their shares in unsuccessful ones." Moreover, an active securities mar-
indemnification expenses and to protect officers and directors directly on occasions when the corpora-
tion will not, or cannot, do so. See Bishop, supra note 10, at 1087-89.
13. Of course, imposing liability for ordinary negligence is usually said to serve a deterrent or
regulatory function as well. Therefore, we may well care who pays the damages, if we want to deter
or regulate particular parties. See G. CALARESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970) (discuss-
ing "general deterrence").
14. See, e.g., Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. ECON. 288 (1980);
Jensen & Medding, Theory of the Firn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
15. See Fama, supra note 14, at 289-90.
16. For financial purposes, the limited-liability feature of the equity contract permits recharacter-
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ket permits shareholders to diversify their investment portfolios at low
cost. By holding shares in many different firms, they can protect against
and possibly offset losses arising from the poor performance of any single
firm.
1 7
Counterbalancing these advantages, however, are the familiar costs of
an agency relationship. Dispersed, diversified, and disorganized share-
holders must entrust the operation of the firm to managers. But unless
these managers are also principal shareholders, their interests will not
dovetail with those of the shareholders. Managers' interests will instead
depend on the corporation's return to their own specialized "investment"
of time, skill, and reputation. Thus, managers will manage with an eye to
increasing their own expected utility by maximizing future compensation
including salary, job tenure, promotion prospects, informal perquisites,
and opportunities for consuming leisure and other goods on the job.
There are, of course, important limits on how far managerial policies
can deviate from the shareholders' interests. Senior managers will have an
incentive to police the deviations of their juniors. Overlapping contract
and market controls help align shareholder and managerial interests at the
apex of the corporate hierarchy even if top managers are not major share-
holders. Bonuses and stock option plans, for example, link managerial
compensation to firm performance; salaries are open to periodic renegoti-
ation; and exceptional managerial service may find its reward in a better
reputation or in job offers from other firms, just as poor performance can
jeopardize tenure by triggering termination, takeovers, proxy fights, or, in
the extreme, the bankruptcy of the firm itself."8
ization of the shareholders' interest as a call option. Shareholders can be said to "sell" the firm to its
creditors subject to the right to repurchase it by meeting the terms of its indebtedness. As with any call
option, risk is limited by share price but the potential for gain is unlimited. See R. BREALEY & S.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 430-31; Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. (1984) (forthcoming).
17. For a useful introduction to diversification and capital-asset pricing, see R. BREALEY & S.
MYERS, supra note 16, at 112-56. Portfolio diversification only eliminates "unsystematic risks," that
is, risks that are associated with particular firms. The price of shares must reflect the firm's sensitivity
to "systematic risk" that affects all market assets. See id. at 121. Legal risk is the paradigmatic unsys-
tematic risk, in contrast to, for example, general economic trends which affect all firms in varying
degrees.
18. See, e.g., Fama, supra note 14, at 292, 296-302; Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corpo-
rate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965).
As Fama observes, market controls on managerial performance overlap. The financial market,
product market, and market for corporate control reveal the weaknesses of management teams and can
hasten their displacement. But the most important disciplining factor is the operation of the market in
managerial services. The service market involves both attempts to shape a manager's incentives by
contract at the time he or she is hired and periodic wage adjustments (either within or outside the
firm) which penalize a manager's revealed propensities to consume at shareholder expense. See Fama,
supra note 14, at 295-97. While some after-the-fact settling up undoubtedly occurs, few observers
would venture as far as Fama in relying on the efficiency and monitoring abilities of managerial labor
markets to resolve incentive problems, especially for top managers. For a skeptical perspective on
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Even at their best, however, these controls create only imperfect corre-
lations among the efforts of individual managers, the marginal return
from those efforts to the firm and its shareholders, and the ensuing reward
to the managers. Monitoring and evaluating the performance of top man-
agers are simply too difficult to permit anything like a total convergence
of interest between managers and shareholders.19 In addition, managers
have good reason to eschew full participation in the fruits-both bitter
and sweet-of their efforts. Unlike shareholders, managers are undiversi-
fied risk bearers who invest their services in only one firm at a time.
Thus, they will tend to evaluate firm projects with a risk-averse bias un-
less they are paid to do otherwise. Although compensation incentives and
the lure of career enhancement may partially offset this bias, they are
unlikely to overcome it entirely, even under intense market pressures. Per-
formance measures for top managers are too crude; the dangers of provok-
ing too much risk taking or other strategic behavior are too great; and the
empirical consequences of alternative incentive schedules are too poorly
understood.2
C. The Efficiency of Risk Shifting
This thumbnail account of the respective risk-bearing abilities of share-
holders and hired managers points to the chief cost advantage of permit-
ting corporate officials to shift personal legal risk. Senior executives bear
legal risk as inefficiently as they bear other forms of firm-specific corpo-
rate risk.
Under a de jure regime of dual liability, even law-abiding corporate
managers routinely incur legal risks. Personal liability may follow from
mistake or simple ignorance when legal rules are complex, ambiguous, or
novel. A recent survey, for example, found that as many as half of all
small businessmen are unfamiliar with federal or state regulations on haz-
ardous waste disposal. 1 Moreover, bold decisions may misfire and seem
negligent or worse in hindsight. Perhaps most importantly, lucrative busi-
market controls, see Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8
J. CORP. L. 231, 234-45 (1983).
19. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 306-07 (discussing irreducible agency costs). Note
in particular that securities prices, which value the firm's total returns, suffer a serious shortcoming as
a means of rewarding managerial performance: They do not reflect the nonsystematic risks of firm
projects. See Diamond & Verrecchia, Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Securities
Prices, 37 J. FIN. 275, 283 (1982); Ramakrishnan & Thakor, The Valuation of Assets Under Moral
Hazard, 39 J. FIN. 229, 232-34 (1984).
20. See Vagts, supra note 18. For a highly readable account of the difficulty of crafting perform-
ance measures, the inherent tension between finely tuned incentive plans and the risk preference of
"investors" of human capital, and the consequences of these factors for the structure of law firms, see
Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry Into the Corporate
Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. (1985) (forthcoming).
21. See Small Business, Wall St. J., July 25, 1983, at 13, col. 1.
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ness projects of borderline legality may be worth the wager to the firm
even though they impose legal risks on managers. A now-standard illus-
tration is the legal gamble taken by managers of high-technology firms
who opt to enter joint ventures in research and development despite the
uncertain proscriptions of the Sherman Act.22
If these sorts of personal legal risks are inevitable, however, competent
corporate decisionmakers will either demand insulation from them or re-
quire compensation for bearing them. As undiversified risk bearers who
gamble all their personal assets, uninsured managers will of course de-
mand a very large risk premium if they are simply paid outright for en-
during even a small probability of catastrophic personal liability. But if
these same managers are able to shift their personal risks through indem-
nification or insurance, then the net cost to the firm of these nominally
"personal" risks will be much lower. Both shareholders and insurers are
diversified risk bearers. Each need be concerned only with a predictable
average of liability costs across numerous firms and managers rather than
with the unsettling prospect of a single ruinous legal action. Finally, in-
surance or indemnity agreements reduce a firm's agency costs as well.
Compensating managers directly for their job-related liability risks would
add a dimension of complexity to the already difficult problem of monitor-
ing and evaluating their performance. Even the most elaborate compensa-
tion schemes may not overcome a risk-averse manager's temptation to
"cheat" shareholders by surreptitiously choosing business strategies that
are less profitable to the firm but less risky for its managers.23
Any prohibition of managerial risk shifting must assume, then, that the
ability to alter the personal incentives of corporate decisionmakers directly
provides an additional control over firm conduct that justifies the attend-
ant increases in the costs of firm management. In essence, a manager's
22. See Antitrust Law Limits Proposed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1983, at Dl, col. 1 (reporting plan
to cut back availability of treble-damage antitrust awards in order to end overdeterrence of beneficial
joint development ventures); cf United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41
(1978) (discussing notorious difficulty of distinguishing antitrust offenses "from the gray zone of so-
cially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct").
23. Cf. infra p. 881 (discussion of perverse incentive for agents to take premium for risk and then
engage in low-risk activity).
Recent discussion of perverse incentives that lead agents to engage in overly risk-averse behavior
also appears in the literature dealing with the personal liability of public officials. See, e.g., P.
SCHUCK, SUING GovRNMENT. CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 68-77 (1983) (discuss-
ing how risk aversion is manifested through delay, inaction, and formalism); Mashaw, Civil Liability
of Government Officers: Property Rights and Offiial Accountability, LAw & CcONTEmp. PRoas., Fall
1978, at 8, 26-33 (discussing effects of personal liability on officials' behavior). Schuck, in particular,
argues that the absence of competitive discipline and of opportunities for effective monitoring renders
this problem especially severe in the public sector. P. Scmucx, supra, at 8-12, 136-46. When the
doctrine of "sovereign immunity" limits liability for governmental torts exclusively to culpable agents,
the problems may be exacerbated. See P. Sci-ucK, supra, at 89-99; Mashaw, supra, at 14-22, 26-29.
In such cases, we may be faced with a special form of sanction insufficiency. See infra pp. 878-90
(discussing sanction insufficiency).
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risk-bearing costs and a firm's agency costs are the specialized compliance
costs peculiar to dual liability. All firms must bear them, since even law-
abiding managers face the prospect of offending by mistake. Additional
deterrence is always purchased at a price.
The key issue is whether the benefit-fewer offenses-can be pur-
chased more cheaply. If we need additional control over a firm's conduct,
why should we resort to absolute personal liability rather than to more
severe sanctions on the enterprise alone? Even if contract and market con-
trols do not fully align managerial interests with those of the corporation,
enterprise liability holds out the same promise as personal liability of
prodding corporate officers into following socially desirable policies.24
Hefty damage awards or fines will reduce a firm's earnings-and there-
fore managerial rewards-at least as much as routine business losses of a
comparable magnitude, and probably even more. In addition, unlike man-
agerial self-dealing, typical corporate offenses such as antitrust violations,
tax evasion, or hazardous waste dumping are undertaken to benefit the
corporation rather than to benefit its managers directly. Except on rare
occasions, managers stand to gain only when the firm itself stands to
gain.25
Taken together, these considerations suggest that absolute managerial
liability does not necessarily provide enough additional deterrence to offset
the greater costs that it imposes on regulated firms. Although enterprise
penalties alone can influence managers only indirectly, they remain potent
24. Even if these controls are not frictionless, see supra p. 866, they may effectively deter firm
delicts that offer no particular benefits to managers. See generally Sykes, supra note 6 (discussing
enterprise controls on agents).
25. As an initial approximation, this genre of business delict may be said to resemble other highly
risky firm projects: Hired managers benefit from such delicts only indirectly, through increased com-
pensation for managerial services. If contract and market controls on compensation are weak, then
managerial risk taking will be poorly correlated with compensation, and-at the top level of the firm,
at least-there will be no business-related incentive for taking legal risks; those that are taken will
serve primarily to gratify personal tastes. Indeed, secure managers who can "write their own ticket"
might be expected to search for ways to improve-rather than to jeopardize-their reputations for
responsible business practices. Cf. Engel, supra note 1, at 56-58 (discussing how manager-share-
holder agency problem influences "corporate social responsibility"); Mashaw, supra note 1, at 11-12
(same). By contrast, where contract and market controls tie management compensation tightly to firm
performance, managers will ordinarily undertake clear-cut legal delicts on behalf of the firm only
when the firm stands to benefit.
Exceptions will arise if managers can manipulate the link between compensation and firm perform-
ance. In the simplest case, managers who face imminent replacement-due, for example, to poor
performance-may take "irrational" legal risks on behalf of the firm because they have nothing to
lose by doing so. In more complex variations of this "final-period problem," managers with high
personal discount rates or short expected job tenures might be tempted by illegal strategies that yield
long-term expected losses for the firm-a pattern that may arise if the offense is initially profitable
but eventually subject to heavy sanctioning. Finally, at the middle levels of the corporate hierarchy,
highly variable compensation schemes that penalize poor performance often trigger illegal activity as a
response to firm controls. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 397-99; Ross, How Lawless Are Big CoInpa-
nies?, FoRTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 64.
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incentives in the absence of any offsetting managerial advantage from of-
fending conduct. Yet, precisely because enterprise liability does work with
little personal risk to managers, it induces compliance without complicat-
ing the manager-shareholder contract or disturbing the advantageous in-
tra-firm allocation of business risk. It follows that enterprise liability is
the normal form of corporate liability in the prescriptive as well as the
descriptive sense, and that managerial liability should be viewed as an
ancillary form-as a kind of backstop for occasions when enterprise liabil-
ity is likely to fail.26
II. FAILURES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND STRATEGIES OF
MANAGERIAL LIABILITY
Enterprise liability "fails" as a regime of legal control when the aggre-
gate costs of using enterprise liability alone exceed the costs of imposing
the risk of liability upon both firms and agents. In Part I, I argued that
managerial liability for firm delicts ordinarily increases the cost of legal
controls for firms and their shareholders. By contrast, a failure of enter-
prise liability typically occurs when contractual risk shifting increases
costs to third parties-either the victims of firm wrongdoing or the public
enforcement agencies charged with its prevention.
These costs usually take the form of harm that would have been
avoided either by deterrence or by compensation if corporate deci-
sionmakers bore the full legal risk of their conduct. Yet these costs may
also assume the form of increased expenditures on enforcement. For ex-
ample, public enforcement officials may be compelled to spend more on
detecting and prosecuting offenses in order to ensure that the numbers of
offenses remain at a tolerable level in the absence of personal liability. To
the extent that these costs of additional enforcement exceed the risk-shift-
ing gains of firms or managers, enterprise liability has failed even though
resort to absolute personal liability would not have further lowered the
prevailing level of wrongdoing. But, regardless of whether the failure of
enterprise liability appears as increased enforcement costs or as the harm
inflicted by offenses that might have been avoided, it involves costs that by
definition cannot be reduced by increasing the firm's expected liability.
This insight permits a useful classification of three overlapping forms of
the failure of enterprise liability in terms of the character of the constraint
on increasing the liability of the firm. These failures are (1) asset insuffi-
ciency, when firms lack the assets to pay the law's price for their delicts;
(2) sanction insufficiency, when the legal system cannot charge a price
high enough to deter firm delicts for whatever reason, including asset in-
26. See Stone, supra note 5, at 11-18.
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sufficiency; 7 and (3) enforcement insufficiency, when the legal system can-
not even detect or prosecute a significant proportion of offenses. Each fail-
ure of enterprise liability, in turn, suggests a particular strategy for
managerial liability. Personal liability that can be shifted contractually by
insurance or indemnification functions primarily as a safeguard against
asset insufficiency. Absolute or unshiftable liability serves largely to rem-
edy sanction insufficiencies when it is imposed on managers who control
firm delicts. But when it is imposed on potentially powerful corporate
outsiders who cannot control illegal conduct directly-who can do no
more than monitor for, and attempt to veto, such conduct-absolute liabil-
ity in effect delegates enforcement to these private actors, or "gatekeep-
ers," and thus serves to remedy enforcement insufficiencies by conscripting
deputies within the enterprise. 28 These functional relationships, which I
explore in the following sections, are summarized in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
STRATEGIES OF MANAGERIAL LIABILITY
TYPE OF
ENTERPRISE Asset Sanction Enforcement
LIABILITY FAILURE Insufficiency Insufficiency Insufficiency
TYPE OF
MANAGERIAL Shiftable Control Gatekeeper
LIABILITY Liability Liability Liability
III. SHIFTABLE LIABILITY AND ASSET INSUFFICIENCY
When it is sensible to allow indemnification and insurance for manag-
ers, why impose managerial liability at all? Why not offer managers the
same immunity from personal liability arising from suits by third parties
that shareholders enjoy from all corporate legal risk or that managers en-
joy from shareholder actions under the business judgment rule?29 The best
answer may be that the personal liability of firm agents-and in particu-
lar, of managers and directors-can serve as a partial check on asset in-
sufficiency, that is, on the danger that undercapitalized corporations will
27. The legal system may not be able to set a sufficient price in either of two senses: There may
be constraints on effective enterprise penalties, see infra pp. 883-86, or, even if there were no such
constraints, higher enterprise penalties might simply be less cost-effective than the alternative of abso-
lute managerial liability, see infra pp. 887-90.
28. Potential targets of gatekeeper liability include outside directors, lawyers, accountants, and
underwriters. See infra p. 892. These "outsiders" can simultaneously serve as "internal" monitors of
firm behavior-even though they often are not, technically speaking, firm employees-because they
possess privileged information about firm operations which is inaccessible to public enforcement
officials.
29. See supra p. 862 (business judgment rule); p. 864 (limited shareholder liability).
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abuse their limited assets to evade the compensatory or deterrent policies
of liability rules.30
A. Managerial Liability as Protection Against Asset Insufficiency
The simplest form of asset insufficiency arises when the firm's assets
cannot cover tort damages for a firm's delicts. Although this form of asset
insufficiency has historically been a problem in small, owner-managed
firms that can be abandoned at relatively low cost, the recent advent of
enormous damage awards in products liability, securities, and antitrust
actions indicates that larger, publicly held corporations are also vulnerable
to asset insufficiency.
31
In general terms, the way in which managerial liability might protect
against asset insufficiency is readily apparent. The victims of corporate
torts are involuntary creditors of the firm who, like any other unsecured
creditors, are subject to strategic evasion by shareholders. Just as share-
holders can displace general business risks onto senior security holders
either by accumulating new debt or by increasing the risk of the firm's
portfolio of business projects, so too shareholders can displace the expected
costs of legally risky or proscribed conduct either by operating the firm
with net assets well below the level of its potential tort liabilities or by
increasing the legal risk assumed by the firm. 2 Unlike senior security
30. Shiftable managerial liability might alternatively be viewed as a benefit to the firm. First, it
allows firms to hire agents whose personal liability serves to deter them from making overly risky
decisions. Second, it permits firms some discretion to indemnify selectively, that is, to compensate
officers for damages imposed on them only when it appears in hindsight that liability was incurred in
the firms' best interests. The very breadth and leniency of risk-shifting practices, see supra pp.
861-64, suggests, however, that firms rarely employ the risk of personal liability for corporate torts as
a device for regulating managerial behavior.
31. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 390-93 (viewing asset insufficiency as "deterrence trap");
Hall, The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38 Bus. LAw. 593, 595
(1983) (discussing huge joint and several liability under Superfund legislation). The increasing size of
commercial liability claims has led to a further development that threatens to increase the risk of
corporate asset insufficiency: a fundamental shift from "occurence" to "claims-made" basic liability
insurance policies. An occurence policy-until recently the commercial standard-covers liability due
to events which occur during the period when a policy is in force, regardless of when liability for those
events is imposed. A claims-made policy, however, covers only liability which arises during the life of
the policy. It does not cover losses caused by events which occurred while the policy was in force but
whose effects-and the legal responsibility for those effects-occur after the policy has lapsed. Thus,
claims-only coverage permits insurance companies to limit exposure and raises the possibility that
some injuries which manifest themselves long after the event that triggers them will remain uninsured
entirely. See Hall, supra, at 617-19; Insurance Industry Is Changing Policy for Basic Business Lia-
bility Coverage, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1984, at 6, col. 3. See generally Committee on Bus. Mgmt. Liab.
Ins., Liability Insurance Against Environmental Damage: A Status Report, 38 Bus. LAw 217,
221-31 (1982) (discussing available insurance policies and their relationship to various forms of lia-
bility for pollution).
32. The option model of the shareholder's interest, see supra note 16, clearly shows the equiva-
lence of these two modes of cost externalization. They both increase the volatility of returns on firm
assets. Of course, a variety of legal doctrines loosely constrain the shareholders' freedom to under-
capitalize the firm relative to its expected tort damages. See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor
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holders or other contract creditors, however, tort victims and public en-
forcement officials cannot protect themselves by refusing the firm "credit"
or by demanding a security interest in firm property before accidents or
offenses. Victims of industrial pollutants, no less than pedestrians injured
by reckless cabbies must collect from the firm, its agents, or insurers if
they are to collect at all.
Under these circumstances, the imposition of personal liability on a
firm's participants can rechannel at least a portion of the expected costs of
those business delicts that are attributable to individual agents back to
those agents, who in turn may be in a position to contract with the firm or
its shareholders. In effect, dual liability gives agents who engage in risky
firm projects a potential contract creditor's interest in the corporation's net
assets and risks."3
It follows that the risk-shifting opportunities that top managers enjoy in
the form of indemnification or insurance are anything but obstacles when
liability rules seek only to price the harm caused by corporate delicts
rather than to bar harmful conduct entirely. Indeed, these opportunities
are precisely the vehicles through which agents or employees can force the
firm and its shareholders to internalize the expected liability costs that
undercapitalization would otherwise impose on tort victims. Indemnity
rights are valuable, after all, only to the extent that the firm maintains a
level of capitalization or insurance that is commensurate with its agents'
risks of personal liability. The purchase of personal liability insurance for
agents is simply an alternative method of guaranteeing that the firm's own
risks are adequately insured. Subject to the limitations of available insur-
ance policies, plaintiffs can recover from the insured individual if the firm
lacks the assets to satisfy a judgment. 4
From this perspective, the real defect of personal liability as a check on
undercapitalization lies in the danger that agents will not pressure the
firm into providing adequate coverage of their personal liability risks. If
to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505 (1977) (discussing state law capital requirements, fraudulent
conveyance laws, equitable subordination, and corporate "veil piercing" doctrine). Only the California
courts, however, have gone so far as to suggest that undercapitalization relative to risk may itself be a
ground for disregarding the corporate fiction and holding shareholders liable for tort debts. See Min-
ton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579-80, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961); W. CARY
& M. EiSENBERG, supra note 7, at 95-96 (discussing California's approach). Other states, notably
New York, have refused to follow California. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d
6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
33. Unsecured contract creditors also have an incentive to monitor the firm's legal risk taking,
since in the event of bankruptcy they will participate in the firm's estate with tort creditors on an
equal basis. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (1982). Unsecured contract creditors, however, are likely to be
poorly placed to monitor risk taking in comparison to managers. See Levmore, Monitors and Freer-
iders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 50-59, 76-82 (1982).
34. Liability insurance for corporate officers and directors normally comes in the form of modified
claims-only policies. These limit coverage for delayed claims according to a complex formula. See
Bishop, Understanding D & 0 Insurance Policies, HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 20, 27, 30.
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the firm hires judgment-proof agents at a premium, for example, it merely
carries the undercapitalization one step further by exploiting the limited
assets of both the enterprise and its risk-taking agents. Worse yet, if the
firm's agents lack sufficient information about either the magnitude of
their expected liability costs or the firm's ability to offset these costs, they
may fail to bargain with the firm for sufficient insulation from personal
risk. In this case, agent liability merely shifts the risks of firm activities
from one set of inefficient risk bearers to another-from unlucky tort vic-
tims to defrauded employees. 5
Imposing shiftable personal liability on high corporate officials, how-
ever, largely avoids these dangers. Unlike lower-level corporate agents,
senior managers and directors are ideal targets for incentives aimed at
ultimately prodding the firm to cover its potential liability. Their position
normally provides them with information about the need for insurance;
their power assures that they can act on their knowledge of risk levels;
and their personal assets and risk preferences are likely to encourage them
to seek adequate insurance coverage. Even when they are not the firm's
cheapest harm avoiders, they are likely to be its most reliable insurers.3
When these top managers double as the firm's principal shareholders,
their incentive to insure against personal liability for firm delicts arising
from their own conduct will resemble that of unincorporated partners,
who ordinarily insure themselves over the entire range of their firm's tort
liabilities. When top managers are not principal shareholders, tleir de-
mand for insurance may be even greater, since they do not receive the full
return of gambling their personal assets unless they are specifically com-
pensated for their risk bearing.
The very fact that hired managers are costly risk bearers, however, mil-
itates against such special compensation. The same factors that lead share-
holders to prefer providing managers with insurance or indemnification
rather than with outright compensation for risks of job-related liability
will also discourage managers and shareholders from undercapitalization.
Not only is a liability charge against personal assets undiversifiable for
both the hired manager and the owner-manager, but the risk-bearing costs
of the hired manager also include the contracting and monitoring expenses
associated with controlling his or her risk taking.
37
35. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corpora-
tion Law, 30 U. TORONTo L.J. 117, 149-50 (1980) (employees are class of corporate creditor which
face most severe informational problem).
36. Cf G. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 50-53 (discussing enterprise liability as an insurance
incentive).
37. See supra p. 867.
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B. Comparative Merits of Shiftable Liability as a Response to
Undercapitalization
With this much said, I should hasten to add that the extent of protec-
tion against asset insufficiency currently provided by managerial liability
is difficult to estimate.3 8 We do know, however, that the existing focus of
substantive tort law on the personal conduct of managers and directors
seriously limits its role as a safeguard against undercapitalization. Unless
the law develops a managerial duty of supervision akin to the duty of care
that corporate officials owe to the firm, and makes managers liable to
outside tort victims for its breach, managerial liability cannot reach the
vast majority of corporate torts for which obvious managerial fault is ei-
ther entirely absent or inordinately difficult to prove.
3 9
The hard question, then, is whether expanded personal liability should
be imposed on corporate managers or directors specifically to discourage
risk externalization by undercapitalized firms. Any answer to this ques-
tion implicates, in turn, still other, more basic issues of corporate legal
policy. Even setting aside the most basic issue of all-the ultimate wisdom
of limited shareholder liability-the list is still formidable. How impor-
tant is the risk subsidy provided by limited liability to the operation of
small and risky firms? How strong are the incentives that it creates to
underinvest in safety precautions or legal compliance? And how efficiently
could today's insurance markets absorb the risks that firms presently "in-
sure" against simply by limiting their capitalization, especially in the case
of small, privately held firms?
40
Analysis of these issues bearing on the appropriate scope of the "risk
subsidy" that limited corporate liability provides must necessarily be left
38. Reports of tort plaintiffs turning successfully to the personal assets of hired managers of large
firms after already failing to collect against a bankrupt firm are scarce to the point of non-existence.
Yet this fact alone tells us little, since the relevant benchmark is not the frequency with which tort
plaintiffs now recover against managers for corporate torts, but rather the frequency with which these
plaintiffs might not recover at all under a regime of pure enterprise liability. Even faced with the
current possibility of managerial liability, small, owner-managed firms engage in lead smelting and
hazardous waste disposal, activities which involve a significant danger of injuring third parties and
leaving them uncompensated. See, e.g., Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENVTL. L. 645, 658-60
(1978) (discussing how large chemical company resorted to thinly capitalized independent contractor
to dispose of kepone); Madlin, Lead Astray: How the EPA Let One Get Away, WASH. MONTHLY,
Oct. 1982, at 40 (examining EPA's enforcement actions against small lead smelter). But see Stone,
supra note 5, at 71 (large firms already enjoy benefit of limiting their liability by contracting out risky
projects to undercapitalized firms). How much further would the scale of such risk externalization
extend if neither owner-managers nor hired managers could be held accountable for negligent deci-
sionmaking? The response to this question, speculative as it must be, is the only possible yardstick by
which to measure the protection that dual liability currently offers the public.
39. See supra p. 862 (organizational buffer provides de facto immunity from personal liability).
40. See K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RIsK-BEARING 140 (1971); Halpern, Trebilcock
& Turnbull, supra note 35, at 138-45.
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to detailed investigation elsewhere. 41 For present purposes, it is enough to
consider the implications of the plausible conclusion that existing law al-
lows too much corporate risk externalization. 42 The relevant question then
narrows to a comparison between the merits of expanding the insurable
personal liability of top managers or directors, and other, more direct legal
responses to undercapitalization, such as mandatory enterprise insurance
or minimal capital requirements. 43 In such a comparison, the dual liabil-
ity scheme may fare quite well whenever firms can rely on an efficient
and complete insurance market.
44
The chief advantage of expanding the liability of corporate officers or
directors is flexibility. First, expanded liability offers flexibility of scope.
The managerial duty to supervise that triggers personal liability could be
tailored precisely to the classes of corporate torts for which a limitation on
liability seems especially inappropriate. We could, for example, impose
liability on corporate officials for torts that apparently result from perva-
sive, firm-wide inattention to safety precautions or risk levels. When per-
vasive inattention to risk occurs in conjunction with corporate inability to
pay full tort damages, it rises to the threshold of deliberate policy. Here,
restricting liability to the firm and its lower-level agents does more than
subsidize an occasional but inevitable tort loss; it provides an incentive for
firm decisionmakers to underprice risk and underinvest in safety. Al-
41. Thus far, most economic analyses of the effects of limited liability and undercapitalization on
involuntary tort creditors appear as appendages to broader discussions of their effects on contract
creditors. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.4 (2d ed. 1977); Halpern, Trebil-
cock & Turnbull, supra note 35, at 145-47. The analytical framework established by these broader
discussions is nevertheless useful. Limited liability is a form of "bankruptcy insurance" provided by
creditors and must be evaluated in part against the yardstick of how efficiently and completely the
insurance market might absorb risks in its absence. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note
35, at 138-45. In the broader legal literature, Stone provides a powerful brief against the principle of
limited corporate liability for tort damages, see Stone, supra note 5, at 65-76, as well as a useful
reminder that the problem of undercapitalized firms extends beyond the marginal world of tiny, own-
er-managed firms, id. at 70-72. The literature still apparently lacks any equally sophisticated analysis
of the risk-subsidy benefits of a rule of limited tort liability-if, indeed, these can be demonstrated for
an economy equipped with well-developed insurance markets.
42. See R. POSNER, supra note 41, § 14.4; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 35, at
145-47; Stone, supra note 5, at 65-76.
43. Regulations combining mandatory insurance and financial responsibility tests have been
adopted, for example, pursuant to § 3004 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 6924 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See 40 C.F.R. § 264.140-.151 (1982) (establishing insurance
requirements or evidence of self-insurance for operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities); Hall,
supra note 31, at 615-17 (discussing requirements). A third direct solution to the thin-capitalization
problem is, of course, to permit courts implicitly to fix capitalization requirements by disregarding the
corporate fiction when they find that firms are undercapitalized. See supra note 32. For a discussion
of the difficulties of this approach, including the uncertainty that it might create and the problem of
determining a "reasonable" capitalization short of full tort damages, see Clark, supra note 32, at
547-50.
44. The private insurance market may refuse to underwrite some liability risks at all. See Hall,
supra note 31, at 617 (liability for Superfund risks so uncertain that private insurance firms reluctant
to issue policies); cf. supra note 31 (discussing how pressure of liability risks led to changes in policy
coverage).
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though this is not the only "moral hazard" afflicting a regime of limited
liability, it is the most serious because it bears most directly on the fre-
quency of accidents.4 5 Moreover, firm-wide inattention to risk and safety
surely lies within the province of top management to correct or offset with
coverage from assets or insurance.
Second, managerial liability affords firms flexibility of response. Man-
agers can react to expanded personal legal risks in light of the firm's par-
ticular circumstances. Unlike requirements for minimum insurance or
"adequate" capitalization, managerial liability leaves risk evaluation to
the firm's top managers, who are presumably the best acquirers of infor-
mation about corporate risks, internal firm controls, and existing levels of
insurance coverage or capitalization. Thus, it protects against legislative
over- or under-provision for tort risks, and it permits managers to select
the optimal strategy for covering risk from among insurance, self-insur-
ance, and risk reduction through the control of firm activities. 46
By contrast, objections to expanding managerial liability center on the
hardships that such an expansion could impose on individual managers.
Liability based on a broad theory of managerial responsibility conflicts
with the normative principle that personal liability be based on personal
fault.47 It thus resembles anomalous instances in the criminal law where
corporate officers are held strictly liable for firm delicts.48 Further, it
would force managers either to acquire realistic appraisals of potential
liability for organizational torts and commensurate levels of insurance, or
to face heavy expected liability costs which would fall disproportionately
on the wealthy.49
45. As I mentioned supra note 32, shareholders can exploit limited liability in two ways: They
can diminish assets relative to risk levels or increase risk levels relative to assets. Either strategy
increases the volatility of expected returns and hence the value of the shareholders' "option." See
supra note 16. Both strategies pose the danger of displacing expected tort damages onto their victims.
A reduction of available assets relative to "normal" risk, however, bears only indirectly on the fre-
quency of accidents. Its primary effect is to lead to the production of too much risky activity in the
long run: An undercapitalized producer, for example, may undersell competitors and expand produc-
tion. By contrast, inattention to risk levels generates higher expected accident costs in the short run.
See G. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 73-75. Moreover, it is at least possible that the undercapitalized
producer takes greater safety precautions but happens to be unlucky. Such mitigating possibilities
seem less likely when the evidence points to firm-wide insensitivity to risk.
46. Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull's argument concerning the personal liability of directors of
widely held companies similarly depends on the costs of acquiring such information. Halpern, Trebil-
cock & Turnbull, supra note 35, at 149-50.
47. Formally, of course, fault exists whenever a duty to supervise is imposed and is breached.
When that duty is expanded to the threshold of strict liability, however, it loses its traditional moral
overtones.
48. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-73 (1975) (statute holding head of corporation
liable for violation of Food and Drug Act need not depend on conscious wrongdoing of executive).
49. Without adequate capitalization or insurance coverage, the amount of a manager's personal
assets would provide the only certain limit on his or her liability for firm torts. Wealthy managers
would therefore bear a disproportionate share of the firm's expected damages in the event of
bankruptcy.
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These objections carry little weight, however, in a legal world that per-
mits pervasive contractual risk shifting. In such a world, the stigmatic
connotations of legal breach have already largely disappeared-at least for
garden-variety negligence. 50 Personal liability, then, is already understood
as a neutral incentive, akin to a tax on risk taking, rather than as a "pun-
ishment" needing a basis in the principle of individual fault. Moreover,
the ease with which corporate managers already arrange to appraise and
insure against legal risks suggests that the additional burden created by an
expanded duty to supervise would not be large.51 Members of professional
partnerships manage to tolerate similar risks of personal liability with ap-
parent ease; the ready availability of insurance permits relatively decen-
tralized operation ifi even the largest of these partnerships without time-
consuming monitoring by each partner.
52
This nonintrusive property of shiftable personal liability-its ability to
serve as an insurance incentive without inducing unwarranted efforts to
restrict the riskiness of firm activities-may even make it suitable for ex-
tension to outside corporate directors. If the primary effect of a limited
supervisory duty on top inside managers is to spark a review of personal
insurance coverage rather than a redoubling of supervisory efforts, impos-
ing a similar duty on the corporate board and its outside directors achieves
the same result. Such a duty would be fictional, much like the board's
existing statutory duty to manage the firm, but, unlike that duty, it would
carry a very real risk of personal liability. Precisely this risk of vicarious
personal liability would serve as a "pure" insurance incentive. It could not
50. This is not to say that ordinary tort duties never carry moral weight, but only that they do not
ordinarily do so in today's business world. The incongruity of permitting legal risk shifting where the
law intends to prescribe minimally acceptable norms of behavior is iddressed infra note 57.
51 Appraising personal liability risks will place no burden at all upon the vast majority of pub-
licly held corporations whose assets or insurance coverage already prove adequate. Indeed, one of the
great advantages of personal liability as an insurance incentive is the impetus that it gives to employ
the underwriting market as a low-cost method of pricing risk. This incentive value is lost when insur-
ance coverage is unavailable, see supra note 44, or when unpredictably large liability triggers an
unanticipated breakdown in insurance coverage-as has recently occurred, for example, in asbestos
litigation. See Asbestos Firms Push a Law to Limit Their Liability; But AFL-CIO Is Leery, Wall St.
J., Dec. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Asbestos Liability]. It may also be jeopardized by
restrictions on policy coverage. See supra note 31.
52. For an alternative account of the role of personal liability as a "bonding" device in profes-
sional partnerships, see Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN.
327, 336-37 (1983) (arguing that professional partnerships "contract for unlimited liability" to assure
customer compensation for losses and bond the quality of partner services); cf. Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 16 (liability under § 11 of Securities Act augments underwriters' reputations as a means of
reducing the verification costs of investors). In most states, the law concerning professional service
corporations may reduce the risk of personal liability for partnership torts without triggering a whole-
sale exodus from the partnership form. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 608 (1983) (shareholder of
professional corporation remains personally liable only for his own wrongful acts and those committed
by persons "under his direct supervision and control"); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT: PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 11 comment (1982) (despite lack of explicit language, "it seems that
shareholders of professional corporations have limited liability under existing statutes in most states").
The Yale Law Journal
be mistaken for a duty to intervene in the management of the firm. It
would not ask too much from directors, only that they recognize their own
liability risks and delegate the task of appraising risk and providing ade-
quate coverage to the insurance markets or reliable consultants. Finally,
liability that extends even to outside directors would harness the interests
of the one group of "managers" whose risk preferences and stake in the
firm are least likely to support a gamble that jeopardizes their personal
assets.
Of course, such a flexible approach to the initial placement of liability
risks, even on outside directors, is justifiable only when the firm can easily
reallocate these risks by low-cost agreement. In large measure, the merits
hinge on the structure of the insurance markets and the scope of available
policy coverage. By contrast, the crucial characteristic of the two forms of
absolute personal liability that I consider next-control liability and gate-
keeper liability-is precisely the difficulty of reallocating these forms of
legal risk by private agreement.
IV. CONTROL LIABILITY AND SANCTION INSUFFICIENCY
Absolute liability involves the largely punitive forms of liability for
which risk shifting is either prohibited or simply impossible. Imprison-
ment creates absolute liability because culpable individuals cannot truly
shift this sanction, even if they can be induced to risk it for a price. By
contrast, the personal risk of incurring a fine or damages becomes absolute
only if it cannot be shifted by indemnification or insurance. Specific legis-
lation or administrative policies may explicitly proscribe shifting the
risk.53 Alternatively, wrongdoing may be absolute because of the general
bar against shifting costs of liability for torts or crimes committed in bad
faith. 54 Since the legal consequences of wrongdoing are typically uncertain
ex ante, and indemnity or insurance recoveries may not always material-
ize, many torts and most crimes carry some risk of absolute liability.
The uncertain contours of absolute liability thus raise another essential
aspect of the debate over the proper function of dual liability: When
should managers be personally liable for firm wrongdoing without re-
course to private risk-shifting devices? This question surfaces anew when-
53. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-88 (2d Cir. 1969) (§ 11 of
Securities Act bars indemnification of underwriter who knew of untruth of material statement), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, § 104(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(b)(4) (1982) (proscribing direct or indirect reimbursement of fines imposed on individuals for will-
ful violations); Securities Act Release No. 4936, 1 46(a), 33 Fed. Reg. 18,617, 18,622-23 (1968)
(requiring that prospectus of company that indemnifies officials for violations of Securities Act state
that SEC believes such indemnification is "against public policy . . . and is, therefore,
unenforceable").
54. See supra note 11 (discussing counsel's role in evaluating indemnification requests).
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ever legislatures debate restricting indemnification for specific offenses,
and, to a lesser extent, whenever enforcement officials or judges select be-
tween corporate and individual defendants, civil and criminal penalties,
and fines or imprisonment for corporate delicts. In each instance, the rele-
vant issue is the same: Is deterrence better served-for this offense or on
these facts-by a shift from contract and market controls that indirectly
affect the compliance incentives of corporate decisionmakers to direct con-
trol of those incentives through absolute liability?55
Certainly, there is a powerful normative argument to support absolute
liability whenever a top manager's personal conduct breaches flat legal
commands, especially when that breach was intentional. Corporate of-
ficers who conspire to fix prices or who bribe the purchasing agents of
foreign customers, for example, violate federal criminal statutes."' Such
activities lie outside the realm of ordinary tort and are deemed illicit at
any price. It hardly makes sense to allow managers to evade their force
through indemnification or insurance: Either risk-shifting device would
diminish the law's stature and reduce its power to deter. Violations of
these criminal statutes create both a specific injury to identifiable third
parties, and a more general erosion of an entire system of specific legal
rules. Contractual risk shifting of any sort would merely compound this
second, more general, harm.
5 7
55. See Shad, Who Pays for Executive Sins?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1984, at F3, col. 1; Shad Asks
Shifts on Liability, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1984, at DI, col. 3 (SEC enforcement actions traditionally
proceed against offending firm and occasionally against managers as well, but never against managers
alone). Of course, proposals to proceed against managers instead of firms may also serve as a device to
reduce aggregate penalties if managers are likely to be judgment proof or to risk less in reputational
capital. See id. at D4 (proposing proceeding against managers rather than firms in order to reduce
reputational losses of targeted firms).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (price fixing); id. § 78dd-1 (bribery of foreign purchasing agents).
57. This reasoning, which treats the violation of specific legal rules as an attack on the status of
all legal controls, as well as on the legitimacy of the political processes and norms that underlie them,
is most forceful where proscribed activities are traditionally criminal or intuitively highly blamewor-
thy. Stone, supra note 5, at 29-33. For a discussion of the link between criminal sanctions and the
"general" harm inflicted by proscribed activities, see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1124-26 (1972)
(suggesting role of criminal sanctions in preserving distinct systems of property, liability, and inaliena-
bility rights); Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, 27 NoMos (1984) (forthcoming) (criticiz-
ing economic analysis that purports to explain criminalization of harmful activities without reference
to fundamental political norms). In addition, the ban on indemnification for knowing or intentional
torts and crimes, see supra p. 863-64, may also be based on the general harm that is presumed to
result when calculated law-breaking treats expected penalties as "prices." But see infra p. 889 (offer-
ing narrower cost-benefit rationale).
Whatever role such considerations of "general harm" and inherent culpability should play in the
assignment of absolute managerial liability, however, they ought not to exclude the simultaneous anal-
ysis of immediate harm or the public and private costs of enforcement, particularly in the realm of
business regulation. Nor does resort to a cost-benefit analysis of liability strategies endorse a "volunta-
rist" cost-benefit perspective on the part of firms and managers who are subject to legal norms. In-
deed, I implicitly adopt what Professor Mashaw refers to as the perspective of a "compliance critic."
Mashaw, supra note 1 (compliance critics view corporate obedience to established legal norms as
"non-problematic" goal). I suppose that there is frequently too little compliance because many man-
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But this argument does not fit comfortably within an economic frame-
work that considers only two elements: the local, quantifiable costs of of-
fenses and the public and private costs of legal control.5" From this nar-
rower perspective, there is no hard and fast line separating "ordinary
tort" from intentional tort or criminal violation. Whether they are puni-
tive or compensatory, all forms of liability generate costs and benefits. The
benefits are reductions in the level of harmful activities, or, in the case of
ordinary tort, at least assurances that they are adequately "priced." The
costs are of three sorts: (1) the public and private costs of enforcement,
including expenditures on detecting, prosecuting, and punishing offenders;
(2) the private costs of compliance that non-offenders bear, such as risk-
bearing, agency costs, and overdeterrence;" and (3) the opportunity costs
of foregoing otherwise-profitable delicts.60
The net benefits of liability rules are largely determined by the magni-
tude and allocation of risk. Absolute managerial liability is one way to
increase the effective sanctions faced by firms and to reduce the frequency
of undeterred offenses. The relevant question is: When is it the right way?
If managers are more costly risk bearers than firms, why not simply raise
enterprise sanctions, or, better yet, increase sanctions on both managers
and firms but allow firms to indemnify managers?
A. The Deterrent Effect of Imposing Absolute Liability
It is helpful to begin analysis of these questions with an inventory of
the deterrence advantages provided by absolute liability as they appear
from the vantage point of the theory of the firm. To simplify exposition, I
restrict discussion to the case in which top managers directly control of-
fenses. Suppose that these managers are Holmesian "bad men" who are
motivated entirely by self interest. Such managers will undertake legally
risky projects on behalf of the firm only if their personal risk-adjusted
returns promise to exceed what they personally will receive from the
firm's best legal investment opportunity. If legal and illegal projects offer
identical risk-adjusted returns to the firm, managers will clearly choose
the legal alternative since it entails no personal cost, while the illegal pro-
ject creates the risk of personal sanction and attendant damage to their
reputations and careers. For managers to select illegal projects, then, they
agers do regard expected penalties as "price" schedules, but that the high cost of legal controls pre-
vents us from raising the price high enough to discourage these managers.
58. See Becker, supra note 2, at 170-71.
59. These costs ultimately arise from risk aversion, legal ambiguity, and the possibility of mistake
by managers or courts.
60. By hypothesis, the harms to third parties of clear criminal offenses always outweigh the bene-
fits that the malefactor reaps. But see Mashaw, supra note I (legal "voluntarists" see no moral duty
to obey law if corporation's benefit exceeds 'disvalue" to society).
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must expect a premium that exceeds their total expected losses and risk-
bearing costs.
One strength of absolute managerial liability lies in the difficulty of
arranging for such a premium. Of course, there is no difficulty if the
firm's top managers double as its principal shareholders; in this case, the
owner-managers will merely weigh the firm's expected returns on illegal
projects against the combined costs of firm and personal sanctions. Mat-
ters stand differently, however, with hired managers. Hired managers
have made an undiversified investment of their managerial assets in the
firm and must charge dearly for their personal risk-bearing services. Be-
yond this, just as the costs of monitoring and of the agency relationship
induce firms to insdre or indemnify managers for shiftable liability risks,
so too they serve the cause of deterrence by increasing the costs of illicit
bargains. First, it is costly to determine the risk of each project and award
the correct risk premium to each "deserving" manager. Second, it is diffi-
cult to safeguard against managerial cheating, which, quite perversely,
now takes the form of engaging in "too much" legal corporate conduct.
Individual managers may accept the premium but never engage in the
risky conduct or, if the consequences of the illegal gamble unfold badly,
they may subsequently reduce their potential penalties by reporting fellow
managers or the firm to enforcement officials."1
To some extent, the familiar market controls on top managers may ease
this problem of illicit contracting, particularly where returns on offenses
are large or competitive pressures are intense. The threat of bankruptcy
or hostile takeover might outweigh the expected costs of personal sanc-
tions. Alternatively, the firm's standard compensation practices might be
so volatile and lucrative that they override not only managerial risk aver-
sion in directing the firm's routine operations but also the personal pen-
alty risks associated with illegal projects. But such occasions are likely to
be rare for top managers.62 In the usual case, top managers will require
something more: an expectation of additional personal returns that derive
from the offense itself. The inability of even the most corrupt managers to
extract sufficiently high returns will preclude some illegal projects entirely
and raise the requisite break-even point for many more. Consider, for ex-
ample, the plight of successful chief executives who see profitable price-
fixing opportunities for their firms. Why should they risk their future
income and reputation when they cannot readily take credit for this dubi-
ous service to shareholders or claim a salary bonus commensurate with the
personal risk?"3
61. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 387 n.6.
62. See supra note 25 (discussing efficacy of contract and market controls).
63. The contracting problem in this simple example arises from difficulties in negotiating for
The Yale Law Journal
Beyond enlisting this sort of contracting inefficiency to deter illegal con-
duct, dual liability promises another, equally basic advantage: It provides
two distinct pressure points and thus two chances for successful deter-
rence. Managerial "bad men" will undertake illegal projects only after
calculating, however cursorily, the net benefits both for the firm and for
themselves."4 Leaving aside the difficulties of managers' securing personal
risk premiums, the break-even point for an illegal activity is established
jointly by both the firm's and the manager's expected penalty costs. Be-
cause firms and managers may be affected differently by the same kind of
sanction-for example, punitive damages or fines-imposing these penal-
ties on both firms and managers "diversifies" their impact, and lessens the
risk that they were set too low for either of their prospective targets.
Firms that are insensitive to current levels of enterprise liability for a par-
ticular offense may nonetheless desist from offending because the manag-
ers who control the firm's behavior have personal assets which are vulner-
able to individual-level fines. In addition, dual liability can also diversify
across qualitatively different kinds of sanctions. A firm's managers, for
example, might be vulnerable to the risk of stigma and prison from crimi-
nal conviction even if the firm, as an entity, is not.65 In short, a dual
liability regime that joins absolute personal liability with enterprise liabil-
ity offers two sanctioning tools, each providing a different marginal deter-
rent. Together, they may provide far more effective deterrence than com-
parable levels of either could alone.
payment of an adequate risk bonus with representatives of the firm-presumably its directors and
principle shareholders. Even revealing the grounds for such a bonus would be costly, since it would
release information about the proposed offense and thus raise the expected probability of eventual
discovery. Beyond this, the actual negotiation of a suitable risk premium raises problems of determin-
ing the risks, the worth of managerial risk-bearing services, and the danger of "cheating" by either
side, depending on whether the premium is paid before or after the risk is incurred. See Stone, supra
note 5, at 52-55; supra pp. 866-69 (discussing risk shifting). Without the negotiation of a risk pre-
mium, however, chief executives are likely to profit from offenses only to the extent that their own
total compensation is linked to firm performance. Offense opportunities may still be worth exploiting,
but only if they are so lucrative that the executives' share of the net returns from the offenses exceeds
their total expected liability costs. In other words, their expected share of the gain must outweigh the
nondiversifiable risk of a substantial fine or prison sentence and the loss of lucrative future earnings
and status. These simple hypotheses might be tested empirically by contrasting the compliance records
of firms for which the personal risk-bearing costs of managers are most likely to be offset by expected
gains from offense conduct with compliance records of firms for which they are not. The difficulties of
negotiating illicit risk premiums should lead to a high incidence of illegal conduct by top officials: (1)
where managers are principal or important equity holders; (2) where firms face intense market pres-
sures that threaten to displace incumbent managers; or (3) where managerial compensation varies
dramatically with performance-through, say, stock options or volatile bonus awards.
64. Absent final period problems or highly variable incentive schemes, managers ordinarily profit
from firm delicts only if the firm also profits. See supra note 25.
65. See Shad, supra note 55.
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B. Limits on the Magnitude of Enterprise Sanctions
Whatever the additional deterrence advantages that dual liability pro-
vides, however, the basic question remains: Why not rely on enterprise
liability, alone or in tandem with shiftable managerial liability, instead?
In theory, after all, the additional deterrent kicker of absolute liability can
also be obtained by imposing more severe penalities on the firm or on the
firm's top managers if the firm's assets are insufficient. In practice, how-
ever, enterprise liability may fail because of sanction insufficiency. It is
often impracticable to raise penalties on a firm to an adequate level. Such
"failure" may take two forms. First, effective penalties on firms simply
cannot be made arbitrarily severe in the real world; they are limited by
absolute constraints, cost considerations, and impediments arising from
widespread convictions and institutional practices at every level of the le-
gal system. Second, even if forcing larger penalties on firms alone could
reduce residual harm from a particular offense at an acceptable cost, abso-
lute liability imposed on managers may sometimes be less costly.
Consider the simpler form of sanction insufficiency, which arises di-
rectly from the practical limits on the severity of firm penalties.68 Such
limits are particularly significant for the many complex, low-visibility of-
fenses that outsiders can detect only with great difficulty. These offenses
run the entire gamut of business delicts, from transactional offenses, such
as price-fixing or securities fraud, to key production offenses, including
many serious violations of product safety and pollution regulations.
67
Here, as elsewhere, the effective deterrent will not be the formal sanction
as imposed, but rather the formal sanction as discounted by the
probability and timing of successful detection and prosecution. For these
offenses the discount factor is likely to be particularly large.68
In addition, there are significant restrictions on the potential magnitude
66. For more detailed discussion of the limits of enterprise penalties, see Coffee, supra note 5, at
389-407; Stone, supra note 5, at 24-28.
67. See, e.g., W. SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS: AN Eco-
NOMIC CRrrMQUE 2-3 (1981); Coffee, supra note 5, at 391.
68. Thus, any practical limits on either the magnitude of formal sanctions or the likelihood of
their imposition will constrain the maximum expected penalties that firms confront. In addition to
dual liability strategies-the specific focus of this Article-there are other enforcement devices for
circumventing limitations on expected penalties. These range from secondary controls over firm "in-
puts" that seek to decrease the risk of primary violations (as, for example, speed limits seek to de-
crease the risks of accidents caused by hazardous driving) to reporting requirements and government
inspection. Professor Stone provides a taxonomy of these devices and "interventionist" legal tech-
niques. See Stone, supra note 1, at 5-19; Stone, supra note 5, at 36-45; see also Wittman, Prior
Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL
STuD. 193 (1977) (contrasting regulation of inputs with ex post liability for harm). Both intervention-
ist devices and strategies that attempt to compensate for a low probability of successful prosecution
serve in large part as techniques for reducing the information costs of legal control. As such, they may
warrant systematic comparison with institutions that reduce the cost of information in market settings.
See infra p. 900.
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of enterprise sanctions. First, normative limits constrain sanctions. Other
values compete with deterrence for the allegiance of the legal system. Ret-
ribution, for instance, seeks a measure of equivalency between the injury
an actor caused and the punishment meted out,6" and equal treatment
requires similar penalties for similarly harmful offenses.70 Both norms
rest on ex post evaluations of the harmfulness of offenses; both support a
relationship of rough proportionality between the harm of the offense and
the severity of sanctions. Thus, both norms indicate that punishing less
harmful but easily hidden delicts more severely than serious but obvious
offenses would distort the structure of penalties. 71 For this reason, these
norms may resist efforts to raise formal penalties to offset the likelihood
that many offenses are never successfully prosecuted.
Second, an appealing if not always properly circumscribed economic
consideration weighs heavily against penalizing firms into bankruptcy. In
the absence of perfect markets, the punitive liquidation or reorganization
of culpable firms may hurt not only managers and shareholders, who ar-
guably deserve punishment, but also all other participants within the
firm-employees, suppliers, and distributors-who also share in the
firm's successes and failures. 71 For example, if a large fine precipitates the
shutdown of a marginally profitable firm, employees will face immediate
unemployment and perhaps a permanent loss of earnings if they are
forced to work in lower-paying jobs. These losses are severe; employees,
like managers and many small suppliers, cannot diversify their stake in
the firm, and prior to the legal debacle they are unlikely to have received
any wage premium fully reflecting the risky character of their "invest-
ment."178 By contrast, shareholders, who presumably are diversified, may
lose little in a shutdown, especially if the firm's earnings prospects are
truly marginal. The spectre of this scenario, or something quite like it, is
undoubtedly a powerful constraint on enterprise-level penalties,7" even
69. See Gross, Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 500-02 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds.
1975); Corporate Crime, supra note 3, at 1231-33.
70. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977).
71. For a recent exposition of the principle of proportionality in American criminal law, see So-
lem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). In addition to competing normative conceptions of "just" pun-
ishment, penalty levels may serve functions unrelated to deterrence or retribution. They may, for
example, convey a rank ordering of community values about the relative "badness" of offenses. In this
case, punishing a minor but hard-to-detect offense more harshly than a heinous offense would convey
the wrong signal. For discussion of the tensions between efficiency and competing norms in other
allocational decisions, see G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBrrr, TRACIC CHOICES (1978).
72. In the case of reorganization, of course, employees, suppliers, and customers will suffer only to
the extent that the firm is forced to curtail its ongoing operations.
73. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 401, 406-07; supra pp. 864-66 (discussing differential capacities
to diversify risk).
74. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967) (denying award
of punitive damages against negligent drug company because amount could be "catastrophic"). Con-
sider also reports of the Environmental Protection Agency's reluctance to seek the enormous penalties
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when liquidation is improbable for healthy firms and likely for failing
ones regardless of sanctioning."
Finally, as the magnitude of potential fines rises, the marginal benefits
of sanctions decrease and the marginal costs increase. Marginal benefits
decline because few additional culprits are deterred past a certain point.78
Marginal costs for both enforcers and innocent firms will rise. Individual
sanctioning errors will become more costly as mistakenly convicted firms
receive larger penalities, and the expense of successful prosecution is likely
to rise as firms invest more in defensive tactics, and as judges and juries
become more reluctant to convict.7 Similarly, the costs of overdeterring
innocent, risk-averse managers-the costs of self-monitoring and the fore-
for continuing violations of air pollution standards authorized by the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 7413 (1976). See Madlin, supra note 38; Good Hope, La., Refinery Leads State in Fines for
Violating Pollution Laws, Wall. St. J., Sept. 21, 1982, at 20, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Good Hope
Refinery ]. Some small polluters with limited assets are apparently not only aware of this reluctance,
but have learned to exploit it. Madlin describes a case in which a small firm emitting dangerous levels
of lead pollution succeeded in evading detection for nine years through the simple expedient of failing
to apply for an emissions permit, and, after its chance detection, continued to pollute under the threat
of a $25,000 per day fine until reaching a negotiated settlement costing a tiny fraction of its maximum
possible fine of $25,000,000. Madlin, supra note 38, at 44; see also Good Hope Refinery, supra (EPA
accepts fraction of assessed fines after oil refinery pleads poverty; deterrent effects of fines questioned).
Ironically, recent products liability litigation suggests that private lawsuits seeking ordinary tort dam-
ages are more likely to force bankruptcy than the deterrent efforts of enforcement officials. See Asbes-
los Liability, supra note 51 (Manville Corp.'s bankruptcy precipitated by potential liability for asbes-
tos-related injuries).
75. This reluctance rests on a financial paradox. Fines are one-time financial costs and are wholly
independent of the expected returns on the firm's legal projects. Thus, although enterprise sanctions
may trigger bankruptcy, they will have little effect on the decision to liquidate firm assets. They may
hasten the dismantling of already moribund firms, or force new ownership and management on profit-
able ones, but in the absence of serious capital market imperfections, they should not eliminate any
but the most marginal enterprises and projects. But see Coffee, supra note 5, at 401 n.50 (large fines
may induce even solvent firms to cut back, particularly since access to capital markets is likely to be
impaired).
Whatever the actual state of affairs, however, the spectre of forced liquidation and its attendant
costs for innocent firm participants will continue to inhibit the imposition of very costly sanctions on
firms. The popular equation of bankruptcy with liquidation, and of large fines with operational cut-
backs, is deeply rooted. For some sophisticated observers, moreover, the costs of extinguishing even
marginal firms or business projects may appear too great. Id. An apparent equivalent of a large
monetary fine-a forced issue of equity securities-might surmount transactional difficulties imputed
to monetary fines. See id. at 413-24 (proposing "equity fines"). Were it to do so, it would extend the
reach and cost advantages of enterprise liability.
76. If sanctions are already severe, then it is easy to see how the marginal benefits of increases in
the severity of penalties will decrease. Much depends, however, on the distributions of returns and the
harms associated with particular kinds of offenses. When, for example, important economies of scale
attend offense activities, that is, when large and lucrative offenses are the norm, marginal enforcement
benefits may actually increase with progressively higher penalty levels because small penalties have
virtually no deterrent impact.
77. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 405-07. The expected increase in the marginal costs of these
prosecution-related activities is plausible but not axiomatic. Increased costs associated with individual
prosecutions may be offset by a decline in the number of offenses, and hence the number of prosecu-
tions required to maintain a given probability of punishment. See Becker, supra note 2, at 185-90.
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gone profits when managers avoid legally ambiguous behavior-will
increase.
78
Up to a point, of course, increasing the probability of detection and
prosecution can raise the expected costs of punishment without inflating
the size of penalties that are actually imposed. But the sheer cost of de-
tecting low-visibility, complex business offenses counsels against expecting
too much from this stratagem. Too often, detection depends largely on
reports from victims or on insider betrayal. The rate of informational
"leakage" about offenses from these sources is likely to fix an invariant
maximum probability of detection-and therefore prosecution-at any
cost.
Contracting out the detection function by encouraging punitive civil
damage actions might economize on information costs, but such economy
in public enforcement is achieved only with concomitant expenditures on
private litigation and with the moral hazards and enforcement difficulties
that these create.79 Moreover, victims and business competitors are still
outsiders. Since they are already motivated to report offenses, the margi-
nal gains from private bounty-hunting are likely to be limited. Increased
public investment in prosecution is also problematic. The diminishing
marginal returns of increased prosecutorial effort and the invisibility of
social gains from deterring offenses conspire to make enforcement expend-
itures peculiarly vulnerable to budget-cutting, especially when the harm
itself is of an undramatic, barely-visible sort.
78. Overdeterrence of non-offenses occurs when legal rules are overinclusive, or when their ambi-
guity or complexity causes mistakes. Overdeterrence is most common in areas such as antitrust, where
beneficial conduct may frequently appear risky or even technically illegal. See W. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 67, at 22-25; Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer
Now and Then?, 68 GEo. L.J. 1131, 1133-38 (1980); see also supra p. 867 (antitrust example). If
non-offenders who engage in beneficial but legally risky activities are risk averse, increasing penalties
will generate increased marginal overdeterrence costs. See Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff
Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. EcON. Rav. 880, 884 (1979). Most top
managers are likely to be risk averse in establishing the firm's policies even without absolute liability,
and are much more likely to be so with it. See supra pp. 867-68.
79. The peculiar costs of the private market for enforcers arise from several sources. One is the
potential for aggregate over-investment in enforcement, which arises because punitive fines (say, treble
damages) are set to deter offenders, but not to "price" offenses for purposes of allocating enforcement
resources. See Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10-16
(1975). A related cost of private enforcement is the risk of bad faith or misdirected private actions
induced by the lure of large potential recoveries. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTrRUST
PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECoNOMIcS 81-96 (1976). Finally, public or monopolistic en-
forcement may offer economies of scale in the detection and prosecution of offenses, which competitive
enforcement cannot replicate. See Landes & Posner, supra, at 29-30; Polinsky, Private Versus Public
Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 (1980).
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C. Rationales for Absolute Liability
This brief inventory of constraints on enterprise penalties completes the
limited case for supplementing penalties on firms by using absolute mana-
gerial liability. First, regardless of the comparative costs and benefits of
the two kinds of liability, managerial liability can circumvent absolute
limits on enterprise sanctions. Imposing modest sanctions on culpable
managers, who might otherwise escape punishment, avoids concerns over
the ex post fairness of imposing disproportionately severe sanctions on
firms for modest offenses. And where the firm is nearly judgment proof,
managers who control the firm's activities can still serve as targets for
fines or more potent criminal penalties. 80 Second, absolute managerial lia-
bility promises to do more than merely circumvent limitations on enter-
prise penalities; it also permits the advantages of "sanction diversification"
and the ability to exploit intra-firm conflicts of interest in the service of
deterrence and enforcement. 81
The limited rationale for managerial liability assumes, however, that
we have exhausted the opportunities for increasing enterprise liability and
that the gravity of undeterred offense behavior still warrants additional
sanctions. Yet, even if it were possible to increase penalties on firms, en-
terprise liability might still "fall," albeit relatively, because the total costs
of increasing enterprise sanctions needed to achieve a targeted reduction in
offenses are greater than those of a mixture of enterprise liability and
absolute liability on controlling managers. Since personal liability ordina-
rily inflicts greater compliance costs on innocent firms by increasing man-
agerial risk bearing,82 it must possess other advantages that can offset this
disadvantage if it is to compare favorably with heavier enterprise sanc-
80. This observation suggests an obvious point: The distribution of bankruptcy points over offend-
ing firms may have a significant impact on the selection of a dual liability standard. Where entry
barriers are low and an industry contains chiefly small firms with limited assets, we would expect
greater reliance on absolute personal liability.
81. See supra pp. 881-82.
82. Of course, personal liability yields a compliance benefit to firms in those exceptional circum-
stances where managers might otherwise assume "too much" legal risk on the firm's behalf. See supra
note 25 (managers may occasionally assume too much risk for reasons of personal taste or as a means
of enhancing compensation). All firms presumably bear some risk of such a breakdown in internal
controls. Given the fundamental managerial bias toward too little-rather than too much-risk tak-
ing, however, this compliance benefit to the firm is unlikely to outweigh the compliance costs of
managerial risk bearing, at least for top-level managers and for misconduct that benefits the firm in
the first instance.
Absolute personal liability may reduce firm compliance costs, however, for a variety of offenses
outside the scope of this Article. Offenses such as insider trading, which benefit managers directly
rather than through the firm, place considerable pressure on private controls over managerial behav-
ior. Enterprise liability would be warranted only if firms could identify and punish offenders more
efficiently than outside enforcers could-an unlikely circumstance in the case of insider trading. See
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16 (discussing economies of scale in policing insider trading); cf.
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 1370-72 (imposing liability on agents may induce greater care if courts
are better monitors than firms or if there are constraints on permissible employment contracts).
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tions. Given the assumption that managerial and enterprise liability can
achieve the same net reduction in offenses, these other advantages can only
arise from economies in enforcement costs-the costs of detecting, prose-
cuting, and punishing offenses.
1. Costs of Enforcement
Surveying offenses from the perspective of an enforcement agency with
a limited budget, it is easy to see how absolute managerial liability be-
comes increasingly attractive at progressively higher levels of enterprise
sanctioning. As higher firm penalties successfully deter larger proportions
of vulnerable firms from illegal conduct-and as limits on absolute penal-
ties or other factors immunize additional potential offenders from greater
firm-level penalties-enterprise liability becomes more costly and less ef-
fective. The costs of increases in firm penalties or of detection and prose-
cution needed to dissuade an appreciable number of the remaining would-
be offenders become progressively greater. By contrast, because manage-
rial liability threatens a new population of potential offenders-individual
managers-it should deter cheaply, even at modest levels of severity. In
addition, since the same resources already expended for detection and
prosecution of offending firms also generally suffice against their manag-
ers, enforcement officials can purchase deterrence at little additional cost.
Absolute managerial liability also reduces enforcement costs in other
ways. For example, the judicious use of modest sanctions against both
firms and managers reduces the risk of forced liquidation of small or
marginal firms and the attendant cost of an "overspill" 83 of punishment
onto innocent parties. Alternatively, managerial liability might reduce de-
tection and prosecution costs by providing enforcement officials with a
bargaining chip to trade for information about easily hidden offenses. Al-
though top managers may not often volunteer information about unde-
tected wrongdoing, matters stand differently once an investigation has be-
gun." Under a regime of dual liability, as the investigation proceeds, the
expected costs of personal sanctions increase, the likely benefits of contin-
ued loyalty to the firm decline, and the attraction of trading information
for lenient treatment rises accordingly. There is, in short, a symmetry here
with the pre-offense deterrent advantages of managerial liability: Just as
contracting difficulties can make hired managers hesitate before commit-
ting an offense, they can encourage hired managers to aid in the detection
and prosecution of an offense after its commission.
83. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 405.
84. See id. at 387 n.6 (discussing dynamics of plea bargaining with culpable managers).
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2. Costs of Compliance
Standing alone, however, savings on enforcement costs are not enough
to recommend absolute managerial liability. We must also consider the
costs of compliance that such liability imposes on regulated firms: the cost
of compensating managerial risk bearing, the agency costs incurred be-
cause of managerial overdeterrence, and the overcommitment of firm re-
sources to risk avoidance. The choice between managerial sanctions and
enhanced enterprise liability must accordingly hinge on the total costs of
legal control. These will differ with the relative contributions of enforce-
ment and compliance costs. Since the mix will vary for different offenses,
selecting the liability strategy for a particular offense requires detailed in-
vestigation. I have already noted the most important enforcement cost con-
siderations; the relevant compliance cost considerations are even simpler.
These costs arise from managerial risk aversion and the ever-present pos-
sibility of legal mistake or miscalculation.8 5 Absolute liability thus seems
best suited to violations of clear-cut legal rules with little prospect of error
in adjudication or to violations of underinclusive rules for which even the
penumbra of risky innocent conduct is of dubious social value, since
neither category is likely to generate costly legal mistakes. Indeed, wher-
ever the costs of overdeterrence are not important to the overall calculus of
liability costs, the sensible strategy may be to permit enforcement officials
and judges to determine the actual assignment of liability between firms
and managers on a case-by-case basis."' But even with this delegation, the
discretion to employ a mix of policy tools, each with its own marginal
costs and benefits, is likely to be cheaper than relying on any one tool
alone.
Stepping back from the narrow economic arguments that favor absolute
managerial liability, however, it is clear that not all undeterred wrongdo-
ing demonstrates either sanction insufficiency or the need for absolute
managerial liability. Some degree of underdeterrence is the normal lot of
prescriptive liability rules. But absolute liability is strong medicine; ide-
ally, it should be taken only after weighing its costs against the alternative
of increasing sanctions on the firm alone. Viewed from this perspective,
the general rule permitting indemnification absent bad faith or reasonable
cause to believe that conduct is criminal may function as a serviceable
proxy for more refined calculation.87 The rule is formulated this way not
85. See supra pp. 867-68.
86. The danger that accurate information about legal risks may be impossible to obtain is a cru-
cial difficulty with delegating to individual enforcement officials the discretion to allocate liability
between managers and firms. For an inventory of the advantages of the "market system of prosecu-
tion," see Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 292-98.
87. Generous latitude to indemnify is similar in this respect to the rigorous proof and culpability
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because ignorant managers are helpless to prevent firm delicts-liability
provides an incentive to become informed-but because it radically cir-
cumscribes the risk of liability triggered by personal legal mistake. Such a
rule minimizes the risk-bearing and agency costs of innocent firms because
it assures that their managers will rarely blunder into absolute penalties
without prior notice. Of course, we might still choose to impose absolute
liability for serious regulatory offenses-for example, gross violations of
laws governing the use and disposal of hazardous chemicals 88-or for
breach of the duty to report material information concerning a new issue
of securities."' But this decision should rest upon an explicit determination
of the savings in cost that warrant absolute liability for particular classes
of offenses.
Finally, if not every offense requires the remedy of absolute liability,
the converse is equally true: Absolute liability cannot provide the whole
cure for every corporate delict. The Wall Street Journal reports almost
daily on at least one controlling executive from a substantial firm who
(now to his regret) chose to gamble personal liability against the returns
on bribery, price-fixing, or third-party fraud.90 These executives may be
aberrant risk lovers, or they may simply chance upon particularly lucra-
tive, illegal opportunities. But whatever the circumstances, one thing
seems clear: They do not gamble their careers and personal freedom ex-
pecting to be caught. Beyond a certain point, no amount of tinkering with
sanctions can further deter profitable but nearly invisible offenses. If the
offenses are still too frequent, the problem lies less with inadequate sanc-
tions than with prohibitive costs of detection. This failure can be charac-
terized as enforcement insufficiency. The attendant remedial genre of dual
liability is gatekeeper liability, which attempts to force a portion of the
enforcement burden onto firm participants who are not themselves the ini-
tiators of corporate delicts.
V. GATEKEEPER LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT INSUFFICIENCY
Enforcement insufficiency occurs when both enterprise and individual
penalties fail to elicit sufficient compliance at an acceptable cost. The dis-
standards that circumscribe most criminal penalties. Just as the general indemnification rule permits
risk shifting in deference to the costs of managerial risk bearing for all but a very few offenses, so a
default culpability threshold of criminal intent or knowledge restricts severe criminal sanctions to
those delicts least likely to give rise to legal error. See R. POSNER, supra note 41, § 7-4.
88. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1976); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6828(d)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
89. See supra note 53 (Securities Act policy against indemnification).
90. See, e.g., Frigitemp Ex-Chief Admits Conspiring to Bribe Former General Dynamics Aides,
Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1983, at 7, col. 1; Was It Bribing When Donald Crawford Sent Money to 'the
Folks'?, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
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tinction between enforcement insufficiency and sanction insufficiency is
one of degree: Insufficient enterprise sanctions still leave open the possibil-
ity of sidestepping constraints on penalties by punishing managers; er-
forcement insufficiency results only after this alternative has also been
exhausted.
Like sanction insufficiency, moreover, enforcement insufficiency is a rel-
ative concept. Just as sanctions are "insufficient" only if absolute manage-
rial liability can provide cost-effective deterrence, so enforcement insuffi-
ciency exists only when there is a cost-effective enforcement alternative.
Because our inquiry focuses on liability rules that operate on a firm's top
participants, only one alternative remains: the possibility that civil or
criminal liability can induce firm participants outside the circle of control-
ling managers to discover and prevent offenses. These outsiders are poten-
tial gatekeepers. The scope of their liability as gatekeepers depends on the
reach of their duties to monitor for and respond to corporate wrongdoing.
General civil and criminal rules of secondary liability such as the aid-
ing-and-abetting and conspiray doctrines91 impose a limited form of gate-
keeper liability on all firm participants. Yet without the gloss of an ex-
plicitly specified duty, these doctrines are default provisions, much like the
general rules governing the indemnification of managers. They do not re-
quire any affirmative action, but only a passive refusal to facilitate a
known ongoing offense.9 2 By contrast, true gatekeeper liability joins the
risk of absolute liability with an active duty to monitor for offenses. It
imposes liability on an entirely new class of innocent gatekeepers (in addi-
tion to controlling managers) to reduce enforcement costs, the frequency of
offenses, or both.
Top managers themselves are also targets of an enforcement strategy
akin to gatekeeper liability when they face absolute liability for delicts
initiated by others. Absolute liability triggered by broad supervisory duties
falls into this category, as does the startling prospect raised by United
States v. Park93 of imposing strict criminal liability on a large firm's chief
executive for corporate delicts-in Park, for unsanitary conditions in dis-
tant warehouses.9 ' But the paucity of such examples suggests how they
differ from true gatekeeper liability. Controlling managers already serve
91. For critical discussion of the incorporation of these doctrines into securities law, see Fischel,
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAuF. L. REv. 80, 83-86
(1981).
92. See W. PnossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 291-93 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing
requisites for vicarious liability for torts arising from concerted action). But see Fischel, supra note 91,
at 81-88 (describing expanded scope of doctrines in securities law).
93. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
94. Stone reviews the brief list of federal statutes that impose specific monitoring obligations on
supervisors or managers as well as the legislative history of unsuccessful attempts to expand this duty.
See Stone, supra note 5, at 31-33.
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as the firm's chief internal monitors of compliance under a regime of sim-
ple enterprise liability. Elevating their supervisory function to a legal duty
enforced by personal liability would be useful only if enterprise liability
alone failed to induce adequate supervision. 5 If so, however, the question
of when to impose such an expanded duty on managers would merely be a
special case of the broader question of when to impose absolute liability
on managers at all. By contrast, true gatekeeper liability is designed to
enlist the support of outside participants in the firm when controlling
managers commit offenses, that is, when the firm's internal monitors have
failed.
The first requisite for gatekeeper liability is, of course, an outsider who
can influence controlling managers to forgo offenses. For this reason,
gatekeeper liability has received widest play in response to securities viola-
tions and similar "transactional" delicts rather than in response to wrong-
doing that occurs wholly within the bowels of the firm. Gatekeepers can
be drafted from among the many outsiders who supply specialized exper-
tise to the managers of publicly-held corporations and facilitate their rela-
tions with constituencies outside the firm: outside directors, lawyers, ac-
countants, and investment bankers.9 In fact, most of these influential
outsiders have already been tapped for limited enforcement duty. Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933,17 for example, imposes a duty on direc-
tors, underwriters, and accountants to investigate securities registration
statements. Similarly, enforcement actions brought under the federal se-
curities laws during the 1970's have expanded the potential liability of
lawyers and accountants who have facilitated-or even failed to
halt-clients' delicts. 8 In a parallel development, the accounting stan-
dards provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977"9 require
firms to institute reliable internal accounting controls and proscribe mis-
leading statements by both officers and directors to the firm's accountants,
without regard to scienter.100
95. See Corporate Crime, supra note 3, at 1270-75 (discussing imposition of criminal liability for
"reckless" and "negligent" supervision).
96. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) ("In our
complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting
pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar.").
97. Ch. 38, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982)).
98. These actions have proceeded both in the courts-as prosecutions for aiding and abetting
violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts-and in administrative disciplinary proceed-
ings brought by the SEC under its authority to discipline professionals who practice before it. See,
e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (setting forth duty to
intervene in illegal transaction); In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP'. (CCH) 1
82,847 (SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5464) (duty to take "prompt action" in response to ongoing
client offense); cf. Fishel, supra note 91, at 82 (discussing recent imposition of liability for securities
violations on a range of secondary actors).
99. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78ff (1982).
100. See Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (1983).
Vol. 93: 857, 1984
Corporate Liability
Despite their disparate roles, moreover, it is easy to see why outside
directors, accountants, lawyers, and underwriters are likely targets for a
gatekeeper liability strategy. Each has or might have low-cost access to
information about firm delicts. Contractually or informally, each already
performs a private monitoring service on behalf of the capital markets.101
But most important, each is an outsider with a career and assets beyond
the firm. At the very least, these potential gatekeepers face incentives that
differ systematically from those of inside managers; in the usual case, they
are likely to have less to gain and more to lose from firm delicts than
inside managers. Indeed, gatekeeper liability can jeopardize not only the
personal interests of individual lawyers and accountants, but also the
larger interests and reputations of their respective firms or even of their
entire professions.102
This extensive reach of gatekeeper liability, in particular, suggests that
it generally acts to magnify both the costs of compliance for innocent par-
ties and the benefits of effective deterrence for guilty ones in comparison
with liability imposed on controlling managers. Outsiders will be more
reluctant than managers to risk personal liability on the firm's behalf.
Thus, if these gatekeepers can detect offenses, it will be difficult-or at
least very costly-to entice them into a conspiracy. Many offenses will fail
because these outsiders prove impossible to corrupt, others will fall be-
cause the price of corruption exceeds its potential benefits, and still others
will never be attempted in the expectation that they would fail for either
reason. But regardless of the mechanism interdicting offenses, whenever
potential offenders must employ incorruptible outsiders to gain legitimacy
or expertise or to meet a legal requirement,10 3 gatekeeper liability will
thwart a class of offenses that are unreachable through enterprise-level or
managerial sanctions. Of course, firms will also pay for the risk of addi-
101. See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership From Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301,
314-15 (1983) (outside directors); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16 (accountants and underwrit-
ers); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 20 (law firms); Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Audit-
ing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1983) (accountants).
102. To the extent that not only individual firms but also entire professions possess reputations
that enhance the value of their members' services, the breach of well-understood gatekeeper conven-
tions diminishes the value of a profession-wide asset. Cf. infra p. 895 (firm reputation). In a similar
way, legal liability and codes of professional ethics may bolster the value of professional services in the
eyes of parties who transact with clients by increasing the perceived reliability of individual lawyers or
firms who lack established reputations. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16. SEC enforcement
actions during the 1970's sparked a sharp and continuing debate over lawyers' ethical obligations to
third parties and public enforcement agencies. See Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the
Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MicH. L. REv. 423, 445-65 (1978).
103. The SEC requires that an independent public accountant certify financial statements in an-
nual reports, registration statements, and other filings governed by its integrated financial reporting
rules. See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1983). In particular, Rule 2-01(b) specifies that certified
public accountants must be independent "in fact" to be recognized as such by the SEC and lists
potential conflicts of interest that bear on independence. Id. § 210.2-01(b).
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tional liability in the familiar ways. If outside gatekeepers cannot shift
their liability risks, they will charge high risk premiums. In addition, they
will have a powerful incentive to lobby for the overinvestment of firm
resources in monitoring for offenses and against profitable but risky inno-
cent conduct. In the extreme, they may even withdraw their services en-
tirely from small or risky firms.
There is, however, much more to the economic analysis of gatekeeper
liability than is revealed by this rough portrait of costs and benefits. Gate-
keeper liability is qualitatively more interventionist and therefore more
complex than the simple imposition of absolute liability on controlling
managers. Its enforcement potential depends not only on the offense and
the level of culpability that triggers personal liability, but also on the
choice of gatekeepers and upon the design of their duties. Two problems
deserve particular mention. 0
A. The Market for Gatekeepers' Services
The first of these concerns is the sensitivity of potential gatekeepers to
the risk of personal liability. While outsiders will tend to be more vulner-
able to legal risk than insiders, the problem of gatekeeper incentives is
actually far more tangled than this generalization implies. Corporate
managers, for example, are usually free to control the selection and tenure
of outside directors, lawyers, and accountants.10 5 Thus, it may be child's
play for would-be offenders to select corrupt or captive outsiders who are
only too willing to assume personal liability for a price. To evaluate this
prospect, we must know a good deal more about managerial incentives in
selecting outside participants: What are the incentives to employ reputable
law firms and truly independent outside directors, and what are the costs
of discharging them?
Similarly, we need to learn more about the specific structure of incen-
tives on the gatekeepers' side of the market. What, for example, are the
incentives of individual lawyers and accountants as distinct from the law
and accounting firms of which they are members? Although facilitating
clients' offenses may be anathema to established firms with deep pockets
and venerable reputations, individual members of these firms may face a
104. Considerations of space and complexity preclude a full review of these questions in this
Article. I plan to address them at greater length in a future article devoted to gatekeeper liability.
105. Firms registered under the Securities Exchange Act must, however, disclose the discharge or
replacement of their principal independent accountant and describe any disagreement over accounting
procedures that preceded the change. Form 8-K, Item 4, 42 Fed. Reg. 4429, 4430 (1977). Similarly,
issuers of securities must disclose resignations of directors over policy matters and, if the director
requests, summarize the director's description of the disagreement. Id. (Item 6). These are, however,
extremely modest limits on the power of top managers to control the tenure of accountants and outside
directors.
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substantially different set of incentives, especially if derelict clients can aid
professional careers, either inside or outside law and accounting firms.'06
When members of established professional firms facilitate clients' offenses,
they effectively expropriate and injure the firm's reputation. This element
of "firm-specific capital' ' 107 is among the firm's most valuable assets; it is
uninsurable and, unlike the business of particular clients, it cannot be
protected by diversifying the firm's clientele.'0 8 Thus, the conflict of inter-
est between the firm and its individual members turns the familiar prob-
lem of dual liability topsy-turvy. The question now becomes whether to
extend liability from the individual to the firm even though the firm may
be the more costly risk bearer and may also bear de facto legal risk from a
loss of reputation even without formal liability.
B. Gatekeepers' Duties
Detailed analysis of the incentives on each side of the market for gate-
keepers' services, however, is only one factor in predicting the potential
efficacy of gatekeeper liability and the proper targeting of these liability
rules. Another equally tangled problem is the cost-effective design of the
potential gatekeepers' legal duties.
The success of gatekeeper liability hinges on the development of legal
duties that encourage the detection and interdiction of offenses without
overburdening the private relationships that serve as their vehicles. This
requires the prudent crafting of circumscribed duties to monitor and to
respond that, above all, do not ask too much from their targets.'0 9 The
design of duties is further complicated because potential gatekeepers from
outside the firm can rarely perform both the monitoring and interdiction
aspects of the enforcement function with equal facility. Thus, at least for
complex offenses, gatekeeper strategies must ultimately focus on how en-
106. Cf. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 20 (examining relation between structure of law firms
and nature of client loyalty to individual partners).
107. See id. (describing law firm's reputation as firm-specific capital which attracts clients and
permits firm to serve as reputational intermediary on behalf of clients).
108. The conventional distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders" might better be understood
as a continuum-even a multi-dimensional continuum-for purposes of analyzing gatekeeper incen-
tives. On the organizational level, for example, an outside law firm is truly "outside" only to the
extent that it has a diversified portfolio of clients. Few firms are therefore total outsiders. On the
individual level, particular outside lawyers have multiple allegiances-to clients, to their firm, and to
the profession-that interact in complex patterns. The senior partner, with an established clientele
and professional reputation in his or her own right, will face one set of incentives; the junior partner
and beginning associate will face quite different incentives to remain more or less independent of a
strong-willed client's interests. For an unusual account of the reactions of five lawyers--each with
different professional and organizational interests-to an ongoing corporate securities fraud, see In re
Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847 (SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-
5464).
109. Cf. Stone, supra note 5, at 36-45 (discussing complexities of crafting bureaucratic
standards).
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forcement might be exercised by an interacting network of gatekeepers.
Once we fit the scope of liability to the enforcement function for individ-
ual gatekeepers, we already forgo any recourse to a fixed relationship be-
tween the nature of particular conduct and the sanctions imposed. The
next step is fitting the duties and risks of individual gatekeepers to one
another to create a secondary control system on the foundations of private
contract.110
For a simple illustration of such a system, consider the roles of outside
counsel and board members. Lawyers may be able monitors of most of-
fenses that are likely to surface in the course of legal research and advis-
ing, but they are poorly equipped to veto any but a narrow range of ille-
gal transactions that depend on their direct facilitation-for example, the
closing of an illegal merger or fraudulent agreement that specifically re-
quires an attorney's legal opinion. 11 By contrast, outside directors may be
well positioned to interdict a broad spectrum of offenses, but they are sin-
gularly ill equipped to detect offenses in the first instance without expert
assistance.112 Each of these natural weaknesses in enforcement capability
must be considered in the design of gatekeepers' duties. One might, for
example, impose a response duty on lawyers to report firm delicts to the
board;... this could exploit the gatekeeping strengths of lawyers and direc-
tors in tandem. Similarly, directors might be given the simplified monitor-
ing duty of ensuring that the firm employs reputable outside counsel and
of relying on counsel's advice.
11 4
Regardless of the structure of gatekeeping duties, however, the discom-
fiting fact remains that they depend upon private contractual relationships
and business conventions that are themselves subject to continuing evolu-
110. Consider in this regard the analogy to monitoring economies that creditors and other outside
interests might achieve by keying contract rights to access to information and to expertise. See
Levmore, supra note 33, at 68-75.
111. See Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lauyer, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,631.
112. See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potenkin Village?, 95 HA.M L.
REv. 597, 632-39 (1982).
113. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983); In re Carter, [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REt'. (CCH) 1 82,847 (SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5464).
114. The judicially evolved "reliance-on-counsel" defense serves a related function. It permits cor-
porate officers and directors to escape liability for a wide variety of corporate delicts that involve
"good faith" or "intent" by pleading that they relied on the advice of a reputable lawyer. See Hawes
& Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1976). In effect, this defense inverts the gatekeeper liability strategy. Expert advice elimi-
nates the risk of liability rather than triggering it. The bar assumes the judicial function rather than
the enforcement function-to the extent that these are divisible. See Reliance on Counsel's Advice as
Defense to Securities Law Violations Discussed by Longstreth, [July-Dec. 1981] SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 633, at A-5 (Dec. 16, 1981) (reporting that SEC Commissioner Longstreth favors reli-
ance-on-counsel defense despite dangers of "[aiccommodating lawyers" and "opinion shopping"). This
doctrine, then, may be viewed as a device for reducing compliance costs, rather than enforcement costs.
See supra p. 880; cf. supra note 11 (discussing role of independent counsel in decision to indemnify).
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tion and renegotiation, perhaps in response to the imposition of greater
liability. Changes in the structure and provision of outsiders' traditional
services can always alter the enforcement capabilities, individual incen-
tives, and liability risks of potential gatekeepers. The oft-noted (but still
undemonstrated) transfer of legal services from outside law firms to the
offices of in-house counsel is an obvious example.11 5 Where it extends to
the responsibilities of gatekeepers, it can reflect both genuine concerns for
efficiency and a strategic response to the outside law firm's gatekeeping
role.
1 1 6
An analysis of the scope of the director's longstanding statutory duty to
monitor securities registration statements may serve to illustrate the limits
of effective gatekeepers' liability. The leading judicial opinion11 construes
this statutory duty to extend liability to newly-elected outside directors for
failing to inspect personally the disclosure contents of registration state-
ments."1 This construction accords easily with the capabilities of inside
directors, who know the firm well. Yet it appears oddly harsh when ap-
plied to those outside directors who lack special insight into the firm's
finances, and who might at best be expected to watch for indications that
the registration is in reliable hands and that there is nothing suspicious
about the behavior or reputation of the firm's managers, auditors, or
counsel.1 9 To the extent that the Securities Act of 1933 now imposes a
115. See Companies Expanding Legal Staffs As the Cost of Outside Work Soars, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 1, 1982, at 25, col. 4 (describing efficiencies of internalizing legal services). But see Pashigian,
Regulation, Preventive Law, and the Duties of Attorneys, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPO-
RATE A7rORNEY 41 (W. Carney ed. 1981) (arguing that concern over shift in legal function to
corporate law departments is unfounded).
116. Cf. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (SEC Admin.
Proc. File No. 3-5464) (to escape objections of outside counsel, client used in-house counsel to prepare
disclosure documents).
117. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The-SEC has recently
promulgated a rule delineating "circumstances" relevant to meeting the § 11(c) standard of reasonable
investigation. Rule 176, 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1983). Although the rule gives explicit weight to
"[r]easonable reliance on officers, employees, and others whose duties should have given them knowl-
edge of the particular facts," id., reasonable reliance is only one of eight "relevant circumstances" and
clearly not a safe harbor. Neither Escott nor Rule 176 appears inconsistent with the skepticism evi-
denced toward outside directors in the legislative history of the 1933 Act. See infra note 120.
118. 283 F. Supp. at 691-92 (reliance on representations and general information unrelated to the
prospectus does not satisfy outside director's burden under § 11 to exercise "reasonable care").
119. Indeed, one hapless outside director in Escott did exactly this by obtaining reports about the
firm and its managers from local banks and a credit service, and evaluating the reputation of the
firm's auditors. Id. at 689-92. Of course, even if Escott seems unsatisfactory on a gatekeeper rationale,
it might be defended as a pure insurance incentive. See supra p. 877. The SEC's policy toward
insurance for § 11 liability stands in sharp contrast to its policy toward indemnification for the same
risks. Compare supra note 53 (restrictions on indemnification) with Rule 461(c), 17 C.F.R. §
230.461(c) (1983) (insurance against liability for delicts not due to bad faith does not affect accelera-
tion). This difference may stem from the fact that insurers are likely to be circumspect in their cover-
age and tough in their evaluation of claims when the moral hazard looms so large. Nonetheless, there
is a certain inconsistency between the insurance incentive rationae-which seeks only to insure that
victims will be compensated-and the goal of deterrence that is usually assumed to underlie the Act.
See Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d Cir. 1969) (denying indemnification
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duty of personal inspection on all directors, however, the real problem
may lie not in its overinclusiveness but in its constricted vision of
gatekeeping possibilities.
12 0
Viewed broadly, the outside director's duty to inspect the prospectus
raises the familiar question of when liability rules should permit risk
shifting in a novel way. Allowing outside directors to discharge their duty
of personal inspection through reliance on reputable lawyers, accountants,
and managers authorizes a new form of risk shifting. Firms can insure
their outside directors by employing reputable experts, and their directors
will demand such expert coverage just as they require insurance or indem-
nification for their garden-variety legal risks. As long as the firm's ex-
perts, in turn, bear absolute liability for breach of their own gatekeeper
duties, the loss of the outside directors' personal monitoring is unlikely to
matter. The corollary, of course, is that the liability of experts who are
best able to monitor for wrongdoing ordinarily must be absolute unless
gatekeepers' liability is imposed solely to assure compensation for the vic-
tims of firm wrongdoing.
1 21
Thus, we return once again to the general problem of determining the
proper allocation of legal risk among the firm and its participants. Gate-
keepers' liability, like managerial liability, varies in its effectiveness and
cost according to the extent to which, and the forms through which, these
parties can shift legal risks. As with the other dimensions of gatekeepers'
liability-the selection of gatekeepers and the design of their duties-risk
shifting must be tailored to the realities of access to information and of
influence over firm conduct for specific offenses.
because liability under § 11 "was designed not so much to compensate the defrauded purchaser as to
. . . deter negligence"), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); see also Dooley, The Effects of Civil Lia-
bility on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 796-98 (1972) (dis-
cussing dual policies of § 11). In addition, it is by no means clear that outside directors provide an
incentive to insure in a field crowded with other insurers. A second mystery of the Escott deci-
sion-the liability of all members of the underwriting syndicate, 283 F. Supp. at 697-is consistent
with a pure compensation or insurance rationale.
120. The legislative history of the 1933 Act suggests that its drafters saw little virtue in indepen-
dent directors who lacked the skill or the commitment to engage in vigorous personal monitoring of
managerial policies. See Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.. 4314 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, 47, 123-27 (1933) (testimony of Hus-
ton Thompson) (bill intended to discourage dummy directors and misuse of directors' personal reputa-
tions to gull investors); Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 80-83 (1933) (testimony of Huston Thompson) (same); id. at 205
(statement of Alexander Holtzoff, special assistant to the Attorney General) (same). This view of
course overlooks the one task that even uninformed directors can perform: They can respond to the
promptings of outside experts who are the natural monitors of management's actions.
121. In this context, the injury to its reputation suffered by a law or accounting firm found liable
for aiding or acquiescing in a client's delict is absolute. See supra note 107. Disbarment or other
administrative sanctions-such as the SEC's power to prohibit professionals from practicing before the
Commission under Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R § 201.2(e)(1) (1983)-is similarly absolute.
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CONCLUSION
The continuum from enterprise to gatekeeper liability imposes increas-
ingly burdensome compliance costs on firms, costs that grow in tandem
with the difficulty of deterring low-visibility offenses. On the one hand,
the legal risks of the firm's individual participants grow more onerous as
we expand the scope of absolute personal liability and the range of par-
ticipants at risk. On the other hand, broadening the scope of liability and
limiting opportunities for risk shifting increases the would-be offender's
costs of coordinating illegal activity and "bonds" the firm's compliance
more securely.
These observations, however, only begin the investigation of the rela-
tionship between penalties and organizational structure. The operation of
particular systems of gatekeeper liability remains to be explored, as does
the difficult issue of when gatekeeper liability is a sensible enforcement
tool at all. Although gatekeeper liability is the most intrusive and most
costly of the liability strategies, it may nonetheless rank below other kinds
of regulatory response to chronic noncompliance on both dimensions. The
next step beyond conscripting gatekeepers is, after all, to impose upon the
firm specialized public monitors who are legally empowered to report
wrongdoing or veto it on the spot. Thus, while gatekeeper liability is more
draconian than simpler modes of dual liability, it is less intrusive than at
least some forms of on-site inspection or reporting. 2
Yet not only gatekeeper liability but even the apparently straightfor-
ward strategy of enterprise liability raises complex questions when it is
moved from the familiar terrain of private, for-profit firms to that of pub-
lic agencies and nonprofit firms. What are the organizational requisites
for enterprise liability? How far do its cost advantages extend beyond the
context of the conventional business firm? Recent commentary has argued
the merits of enterprise liability as a tool for disciplining public agencies
but has also pointed to the conceptual difficulties of identifying the "enter-
prise" involved. 23 Large public bureaucracies may lack internal monitors
with the organizational power and coherent incentives of private sector
managers. The difficulty of choosing the right unit-and the right
budget-to charge for public torts triggers all the familiar considerations
of risk bearing, agency costs, informational access, and uncompensated
harm that condition the choice of liability strategies in the private sector.
Finally, a still broader set of theoretical questions relates to the possible
parallels between the design and operation of private enforcement devices
122. For example, see Christopher Stone's account of "bureaucratic constraints." Stone, supra
note 5, at 36-42.
123. See P. ScHucK, supra note 23, at 102-06.
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and the selection of liability strategies. The progression from enterprise
liability to gatekeeper liability corresponds in rough outline to a repertoire
of voluntary signaling techniques that are familiar to observers of the cap-
ital markets. 12 4 Indeed, gatekeeper liability in securities law builds on,
and supplements, this array of private institutions for reducing the risk
and the costs of information to outside investors. 125 Similarly, contractual
devices resembling gatekeeper liability occur within large firms as supple-
ments to direct managerial controls.12 Although legal liability controls
differ from these private orderings in numerous empirical and normative
respects, there are important similarities as well. Private surety, bonding,
and monitoring contracts generate conflicts of interest between their prin-
cipals for the purpose of insuring or informing third parties. The liability
of the firm's individual participants performs a similar task over the entire
spectrum of corporate liability strategies: It creates, in effect, private con-
flicts of interest in the public interest.
124. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16; cf. supra note 110 (discussing division of monitor-
ing roles among firm creditors). The privately imposed analogues of enterprise liability are costs that
the firm may incur when its strategic behavior injures investors or other contracting parties. Although
loss of reputation is the most obvious example of such a cost, firms may also contract to bear addi-
tional penalties in the event of misrepresentation or default by entering warranty, bonding, or hostage
agreements. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16; Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using
Hostages to Support Exchanges, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983). These devices reduce the risk and
information costs for third parties that are associated with the firm's representations or promises of
future performance, but only when these contracts can reasonably be expected to deter the strategic
behavior in question.
When such private "enterprise penalties" are not credible signals, issuers of securities may turn to
other measures to increase their credibility. The analogue of managerial liability is signaling that
relies directly on the incentives of individual managers. For example, outside investors may give more
credit to the representations of managers who are themselves heavily invested in the firm and share
the financial interests of stockholders. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Pro-
tection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. (1984) (forthcoming). Similarly, the signaling function of mana-
gerial incentives may help to explain the capital structure and dividend policy of firms. See id.; Ross,
The Determinants of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23
(1977). Finally, a private analogue to gatekeeper liability may be found in risks assumed by reputa-
tional intermediaries such as investment bankers, who place established reputations on the line in
vouching for the securities of unseasoned new issuers. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16.
125. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16; supra p. 893.
126. A striking example is the remedy introduced by Southern Pacific Railroad to the chronic
problem of employee drunkenness among train-crew members: One out of every four crew members
must sign a "sniff-and-see" agreement which makes the signer responsible for all others in his crew
who violate the alcohol and drug prohibition. Alchohol and Drug Use by Railway Crewmen Poses
Threat to Safety, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1983, at 1, col. 1. The agreement is a "desperation-type
response," id. at 20, much like its legal analogue. Workers, however, apparently find it more accept-
able than spot checks of blood-alcohol levels. See id. at 1.
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